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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the critical shortage of lawyers in Africa, 
using Zambia as a case study.  The Article draws on information 
from a variety of sources, including field interviews, survey data, 
and case data from Zambian courts, in addition to secondary-
source material.  Though other work has dealt with access to 
justice in Africa broadly and with issues that affect access to justice, 
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including African legal education, prison conditions, and 
alternatives to formal legal representation, this Article is the first 
comprehensive analysis of the causes of the scarcity of African 
lawyers, the effects of the shortage, and potential avenues for 
addressing the crisis, including measures for making more efficient 
use of currently available legal resources and reforms to increase 
the size of the African bar.  Now, because of the extreme scarcity of 
African lawyers, most criminal defendants go without 
representation, and most Africans with civil claims have no 
reasonable possibility of hiring a lawyer.  The causes of this crisis 
date to colonial policies that discouraged higher education for 
native Africans.  More recently, donor fatigue and the limited 
availability of public resources for education, compounded by 
World Bank and IMF austerity measures, have perpetuated the 
problem.  Likewise, poor policy choices at African law schools and 
African bar admissions programs have exacerbated the dilemma.  
Zambia, and other countries in the region, could enhance the 
impact of their limited legal communities by allowing the use of 
contingency fees, reducing or eliminating the civil caseloads of 
overburdened and understaffed legal aid departments, and 
making more extensive use of paralegals.  African law schools 
could improve the quality of their graduates by implementing 
policies to combat rampant dereliction of duty by their faculties, 
pedagogical reforms, and policies to increase student access to 
learning materials.  Additionally, low bar pass rates would likely 
improve if bar admissions programs reformed their curricula, 
changed hiring practices, and implemented transparent grading 
practices.  Ultimately, growth of the African bar is crucial to 
ensuring adequate safeguards of the rights of criminal defendants, 
litigating complex civil claims, negotiating the balance between the 
competing traditions of the dual legal systems of most African 
countries, and building and sustaining societies subject to the rule 
of law. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It takes a little over an hour on a Monday morning for Alice 
Sitali to meet with four clients.1  The first one, she says, ―borrowed 
some money from a Shylock,‖ to whom he has since paid back ten 
 
1 The events described in this vignette are based on field notes taken in the 
Lusaka office of Zambia‘s Legal Aid Board on Sept. 20, 2010. 
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times the amount of the original loan.  ―Did you sign any 
agreement?‖ Mrs. Sitali asks, ―because even Shylocks have laws 
that govern them.  They‘re supposed to operate within the 
limitations of the Moneylenders Act.‖ 
Before the client leaves, Mrs. Sitali warns him that to proceed 
with an application for legal aid, ―you have to tell the truth, no 
matter how embarrassing it is, or we won‘t help you.‖ 
Another client, a slightly disheveled young man wearing slip-
on canvas shoes, jeans, and a t-shirt, is seeking compensation from 
a stone-crushing company where he was once employed.  
Apparently, the company does not provide workers with 
protective gear, and Mrs. Sitali‘s client went blind in one eye after a 
stone splinter pierced his pupil.  He hopes to get twenty-five 
million kwacha2 for his injury. 
As soon as one client leaves the office, another is at the door, 
and by 10:30AM, Mrs. Sitali is sitting across from a slight man who 
talks so softly that at first she is unable to understand him.  ―I can‘t 
get you,‖ Mrs. Sitali says, and the man speaks up.  He is not her 
client, but his lawyer has been unavailable, and he has a court date 
the next day.  Mrs. Sitali tells him she will try to find another 
lawyer from the office to work on the case, which has been in 
progress for almost five years.  The man is a police officer, but he 
was charged with attempted aggravated robbery, and he has been 
suspended from work since his arrest.  ―I feel that I am being 
tortured, because the five years, it feels like it‘s doubled, it‘s like 
ten years,‖ he says.  He says there has been no trial date for almost 
a year, and the last scheduled court date, in August, was delayed 
again for the judge to attend a conference in Livingstone.  The man 
claims he was an innocent bystander at the robbery and that he 
had never met his co-defendant before the trial began. 
Mrs. Sitali is one of only seven legal aid lawyers in Lusaka and 
one of only twenty-four in all of Zambia.3  She says the suspended 
police officer‘s case is unusual.  ―There are very few that go for five 
years . . . but some do, sometimes the file goes missing.‖  She has 
an amiably imperious presence as she presides over her office, 
which seems to be an epicenter of department activity; secretaries 
 
2 This amounts to a little under 5,000 USD at prevailing exchange rates as of 
January 2012.  See Currency Converter Widget, XE.COM, http://www.xe.com/ucc 
/convert/?Amount=25000000&From=ZMK&To=USD (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
3 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, Acting Director of the Legal Aid Board, 
in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with author). 
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and legal apprentices filter into the room periodically, looking for 
advice and asking questions.  Flies buzz along the walls, searching 
for an escape after infiltrating through the open, second-story 
window, which overlooks an alley littered with an old desk and 
dilapidated chairs and a severely wrecked pickup truck.  Whatever 
accident damaged the truck must also have resulted in human 
carnage. 
Mrs. Sitali‘s desk is neatly ordered and spare, with a few 
stacked files on each side and a large laptop in the middle.  A small 
bookcase against the opposite wall houses several green binders 
containing volumes of the Laws of Zambia, and a bulletin board 
displays a duty roster, artwork by one of Mrs. Sitali‘s three 
children, and a photo of colleagues from the office at a Labour Day 
celebration.  Mrs. Sitali wears a beige suit with a dark crew-neck 
shirt.  Sitting at her desk, she talks about her workload.  She says 
about seventy percent of her cases are criminal, but the High Court 
refers most of those cases to the office, and a disproportionate 
number of the clients who apply for legal aid directly have civil 
claims. 
According to Anderson Ngulube, Acting Director of Zambia‘s 
Legal Aid Board, a quasi-governmental corporate body charged 
with providing legal representation to indigent Zambians in both 
criminal and civil cases, Mrs. Sitali‘s distribution of cases is fairly 
typical for Legal Aid Board lawyers.4  He estimates that each of the 
seven lawyers in the Lusaka office manages thirty-five to forty 
cases a month, the majority of which are criminal cases in the High 
Court and criminal appeals in the Supreme Court.  Yet, with the 
government initiating tens of thousands of new criminal cases each 
year, there is little chance of assistance from a legal aid lawyer for 
the average Zambian charged with a crime.  In fact, Zambia faces a 
critical shortage of lawyers.  While the country‘s population is 
nearly thirteen million,5 there are only 731 lawyers in private 
 
4 Id.  In fact, inspection of the Legal Aid Board‘s central registry reveals the 
Board‘s caseload for 2009 was between 85.4 and 85.9% criminal.  The Board took 
2,127 criminal cases and 365 civil cases for all offices other than Mansa.  Mansa 
received 175 applications for representation in criminal cases and 11 applications 
for representation in civil cases, but records from that office do not reveal how 
many of the applications the office accepted.  Id.  
5 According to the World Bank, there were 12,926,409 people in Zambia in 
2010.  See Data: Zambia, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org 
/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
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practice in Zambia,6 approximately one lawyer for every 17,695 
people.  The few lawyers who are available are concentrated 
heavily in urban areas, and, outside of Zambia‘s three largest cities, 
there are only thirty-five private practitioners in the country.7 
The result is a system in which most criminal defendants must 
go without legal representation and most Zambians in need of any 
form of legal assistance have no choice but to be their own 
advocates.  Meanwhile, a third of the more than 15,000 people 
detained in Zambian prisons have not had trials,8 and many spend 
years behind bars before the courts process their cases.9  Several 
factors have likely led to the scarcity of Zambian lawyers.  At 
independence, in 1964, there were no Zambian lawyers,10 and, 
since then, numbers have stayed low due to failures in the 
Zambian legal academy and obstacles to bar admission.  In large 
measure, these failures result from inadequate funding and the 
effects of the natural self-interests of monopolists.  For most of 
Zambia‘s history as an independent nation, the University of 
Zambia (UNZA) maintained the country‘s only law school.  The 
 
6 Based on statistics gathered from the Law Association of Zambia offices on 
Dec. 6, 2010 in Lusaka, Zambia. 
7 See Directory, LAW ASS‘N OF ZAMBIA, http://www.laz.org.zm/directory.htm 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (listing the number of private legal practitioners in 
Zambia who ―passed the chair‖).  Interview with Edward Sakala, Executive 
Secretary of the Law Association of Zambia, in Lusaka, Zambia (Nov. 30, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
8 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Unjust and Unhealthy: HIV, TB, and Abuse in 
Zambian Prisons 4 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node 
/89819/section/4/ (describing the growing number of people in Zambia‘s prison 
system who await their trials for long periods of time in overcrowded and 
unsanitary prison conditions). 
9 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Zambia: Prison Conditions Endanger Inmates 
(2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/27/zambia-prison-
conditions-endanger-inmates (summarizing the findings of a Human Rights 
Watch Report on the deteriorating conditions of Zambian prisons, specifically 
focusing on the prison system‘s failure to ―provide basic nutrition, sanitation, and 
housing for prisoners, and of the criminal justice system to ensure speedy trials 
and appeals‖); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 4 (citing ―police 
investigation failures, lack of bail, and lack of representation for accused persons‖ 
as the drivers of extended pre-trial incarcerations in Zambian prisons). 
10 See Muna Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa in the Era of Globalization and 
Structural Adjustment, 20 PENN ST. INT‘L L. REV. 487, 489 (2002) [hereinafter Ndulo, 
Legal Education in Africa] (explaining the reasons behind the unavailability of legal 
education in Africa during the colonial period, including an absence of in-country 
educational facilities, the minor role of lawyers in ―colonial enterprise,‖ the 
priority of training other professions, and the fear of providing legal education to 
colonial subjects). 
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lack of competition may have contributed to stagnation of Zambian 
legal education, and a dramatic scarcity of public resources has 
crippled the Zambian legal academy.  In addition, the lawyers who 
run the bar admissions program have incentives to keep the 
number of Zambian lawyers low, to ensure that legal fees remain 
high. 
The shortage of lawyers in Zambia has had repercussions at 
every level of the justice system.  This Article will include analysis 
of the causes and effects of that shortage, using Zambia as a case 
study to examine similar problems, and potential solutions, 
throughout the continent.11  Previous work has examined access to 
justice in Africa broadly.12  Likewise, other authors have focused 
on topics that touch on African access issues, including African 
legal education,13 the application of customary law and various 
customary legal traditions,14 and alternatives to formal legal 
 
11 Like Zambia, countries throughout Africa have extremely low ratios of 
lawyers to people.  See infra Section 2, Table 1. 
12 See generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF 
LAW A REALITY (PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH. 
OF LAW ed., 2007) (highlighting the problems surrounding the provision of legal 
aid in Africa and suggesting innovative ways of solving them). 
13 See generally Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Training a Countervailing Elite: The 
Necessity of an Effective Lawyering Skills Pedagogy for a Sustainable Rule of Law Revival 
in East Africa, 85 N.D. L. REV. 53, 108 (2009) (analyzing and offering solutions to 
challenges confronted in legal education in Africa, with an aim towards offering 
effective legal skills to be applied in the ―East African law school classroom‖); 
Samuel O. Manteaw, Legal Education in Africa: What Type of Lawyer Does Africa 
Need?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 903 (2008) (detailing the history of African legal 
education and recommending strategies for its improvement through ―legal 
education reform‖); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 487 
(―[D]iscusses legal education in Africa, its development, its present organization, 
and the progress being made . . . in internationalizing legal education to meet the 
challenges of the twenty-first century.‖). 
14 See generally C.R. CUTSHALL, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE: COMMUNITY COURTS 
AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE 10 (1991) (assessing data from 
Zimbabwe‘s community courts from 1981–1986 in an effort to provide a thorough 
study of ―customary law in action‖); Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda, African Customary 
Law and Customs: Changes in the Culture of Sexual Cleansing of Widows and the 




(questioning the legality, under African customary law, of customs that encourage 
the sexual cleansing of widows and restrict their property rights); Kenneth K. 
Mwenda et al., Property-Grabbing Under African Customary Law: Repugnant to 
Natural Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, Yet a Troubling Reality, 37 GEO. WASH. 
INT‘L L. REV. 949 (2005) (examining the failure of African customary law to 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/3
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representation.15  To date, however, no scholarship has 
concentrated on access to justice issues through assessment of the 
causes of the shortage of African lawyers and of potential 
measures to increase the size of the African bar.  This Article 
provides such analysis, including recommendations both for 
growing the Zambian bar and for making more efficient use of the 
lawyers currently admitted to practice.  While alternative legal aid 
mechanisms, including using paralegals, can provide significant 
benefits to people without access to lawyers, lawyers are crucial to 
the effective adjudication of complex civil matters, to protect the 
fundamental rights of people facing serious criminal charges, and 
to ensure the development of a society subject to the rule of law. 
Of course, increasing the number of lawyers in Zambia would 
not, in and of itself, ensure the availability of legal services to 
average Zambians.  For example, in the United States, which has 
more lawyers, both per capita and in absolute terms, than any 
other country on earth,16 the poor face severe challenges in 
accessing adequate legal assistance.17  But more competition in the 
legal market would lower fees and, eventually, would force new 
lawyers to seek work outside the population centers in which they 
have currently clustered.  Such growth, coupled with policy 
improvements to increase the impact of the Zambian bar, given its 
 
recognize formal wills and the resulting phenomenon of ―property-grabbing‖); 
Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to 
Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19 (2003-2004) 
(discussing the background behind women‘s nonexistent inheritance rights under 
African customary law in Botswana, Ghana, and Zambia and highlighting the 
need for culturally-sensitive reform). 
15 See, e.g., Hillery Anderson, Justice Delayed in Malawi’s Criminal Justice 
System: Paralegals vs. Lawyers, 1 INT‘L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 1 (2006) (evaluating the 
shortcomings of legal aid in Malawi and the rise of paralegals as legal advisors for 
the poor). 
16 Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why 
Bother?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 875 (2009). 
17 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2006) (discussing the 
difficulties faced by low-income Americans in vindicating their legal rights); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (examining 
inadequate access to justice in the American legal system and proposing strategies 
for improving the system); Lua Kamal Yuille, Note, No One’s Perfect (Not Even 
Close): Reevaluating Access to Justice in the United States and Western Europe, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 863 (2004) (critiquing the American and Western 
European approaches to providing the poor with access to the legal system, and 
offering proposals for reform that borrow from both models). 
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present limited size, could significantly enhance access to justice in 
Zambia. 
Ultimately, there is a dire need for increasing the size of the 
Zambian bar.  Zambia, like most other sub-Saharan African 
countries, faces terrible problems with poverty, corruption, 
sickness, and social despair.  To address these problems, Zambia, 
and countries facing similar crises, must build the capacities of 
their professional communities of doctors, scientists, agricultural 
experts, industrialists, and engineers, as well as their legal 
communities.  Nonetheless, the task of building nations subject to 
the rule of law is essential to allow people in any of these other 
fields to reach their full potential, and lawyers are crucial to this 
process.  They enable a state to fulfill its promises in all categories 
of life, creating predictability in the civil sphere and protection 
from random abuses in the criminal sphere.  To that end, ensuring 
the growth of a country‘s legal community is as important as, and, 
arguably, a prerequisite to, the effective development of its 
communities of health workers, crop scientists, and entrepreneurs.  
By evaluating the scarcity of lawyers in Zambia and exploring 
possible reforms, I hope to provide insight on possibilities for 
reform across the region and in other parts of the world. 
In Section 2 of the Article, I will provide an overview of 
Zambian legal history, with a focus on the institutional structure of 
the justice system and the development of the Zambian legal 
profession.  Section 2 will also include a discussion of Zambia‘s 
framework for provision of legal aid services.  In Section 3 of the 
Article, I will focus on criminal prosecutions and appeals in 
magistrates‘ courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court.  
While the Zambian Constitution authorizes the High Court as a 
court of unlimited original jurisdiction,18 subordinate courts, 
creatures of statute overseen by magistrates, hear the vast majority 
of criminal cases in Zambia.19  The Supreme Court has unlimited 
appellate jurisdiction.20  Section 3 of the Article will examine the 
sufficiency of legal representation in magistrates‘ courts and the 
High Court, including services provided by the Legal Aid Board 
 
18 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 94(1) 
(endowing the High Court with unlimited original jurisdiction except for cases 
over which ―the Industrial Relations Court has exclusive jurisdiction‖). 
19 See infra Section 3 (discussing the role of subordinate courts in Zambia and 
how they operate).  
20 CONST. OF ZAMBIA (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 92(1). 
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and by private lawyers through the Legal Aid Committee of the 
Law Association of Zambia (LAZ).  In Section 4, I will scrutinize 
possible reasons for the relatively low numbers of lawyers in 
Zambia, including challenges in Zambian legal education and the 
difficulties law graduates face in gaining admission to the bar.  In 
Sections 4 and 5, I will examine alternatives to the use of lawyers 
currently available to the Zambian citizenry.  In Section 5, I will 
provide a brief analysis of the workings of statutorily authorized 
local courts, which administer customary law, and of traditional 
courts, which function outside the formally sanctioned justice 
system.  The operations of these customary law courts provide 
some relief from the strain Zambia‘s lack of lawyers puts on the 
Western-style justice system.  At the same time, the use of 
customary law to suppress basic human rights, especially of 
women, underscores the need to increase access to lawyers and to 
the higher courts of Zambia‘s formal justice system.  Section 6 of 
this Article will be an analysis of substitutes for formal legal 
representation in Zambia‘s common law courts, with a focus on the 
role of paralegals.  Due to liberal and ambiguous provisions of 
Zambia‘s Legal Practitioners Act, paralegals are able to fill some of 
the gaps left by the lack of sufficient numbers of lawyers to service 
the country‘s legal needs.  In Section 7, I will conclude the Article 
with a discussion of possible avenues for improving access to 
justice for Zambians, including possibilities for increasing the size 
of the Zambian bar, for making more efficient use of lawyers 
currently admitted to practice in Zambia, and for alternatives to 
formal legal representation.  Throughout the Article, I will provide 
a comparative analysis of challenges confronting other African 
countries and the institutional mechanisms available to meet those 
challenges.  Though I will include examples from around the 
continent, I will focus, to some extent, on former British colonies, 
whose common law systems and colonial histories most closely 
resemble Zambia‘s. 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE ZAMBIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Before Zambian Independence in 1964, the colony, known as 
Northern Rhodesia, operated under a dual-court system in which, 
except for serious criminal charges, common law courts were 
reserved for white colonialists, whereas customary law courts 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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resolved disputes between Africans.21  This system was typical of 
British colonial Africa.22  Lawyers were excluded from the 
customary courts, and when Zambia gained independence, there 
were no black African lawyers in the country.23  In part, the early 
lack of Zambian lawyers resulted from a broader failure to 
promote education for native Africans.  In fact, at independence 
the country had no universities, and there were only 100 Zambian 
graduates of foreign universities.24  Ninety-seven of these had 
degrees in education, one was an engineer, and two were medical 
doctors.25 
Perhaps also at play was a desire by British colonial 
administrators to discourage the development of a profession so 
closely linked to political engagement and activism.26  To train 
African lawyers would have risked undermining the system of 
subjugation at the heart of the colonial enterprise.  In fact, legal 
education through domestic institutions in any English-speaking 
African colony was almost non-existent, and African lawyers were 
 
21 See Sally Engle Merry, Review Essay, Law and Colonialism, 25 L. & SOC‘Y 
REV. 889, 897, 900 (1991) (―[T]his customary law, now touted as indigenous  
African  law  and  the basis for a new unified African legal system, is the product 
of colonial relations and incorporates the inequalities of the colonial past.‖); 
Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489–90 n.10 (stating that, in 
colonized African countries, a dual court system existed in which ―common law 
courts were generally reserved for legal matters involving White colonialists, and 
local customary courts were limited to disputes between Black African Natives‖). 
22 See CUTSHALL, supra note 14, at 12–13 (explaining the operation of this 
segmented court system in pre-Independence Zimbabwe); Merry, supra note 21, at 
897 (noting that this ―dual court system‖ was typical of court systems in colonized 
African countries); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10 at 489–90 n.10 
(describing the segmented court system that characterized the ―colonial 
enterprise‖ in colonized African countries).  
23 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489 (emphasizing the 
absence of Black lawyers in Zambia when Zambia gained its independence). 
24 Id. at 489–91. 
25 Id.  
26 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 55 (noting that ―British colonial 
authorities had a deep-seated fear of lawyers[,]‖ in part because lawyers had led 
the Indian nationalist movement); Manteaw, supra note 13, at 914 (explaining that 
by discouraging the production of a class of lawyers, colonial governments hoped 
to discourage the production of a class of politicians that could challenge the 
colonial government); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 489 
(arguing that the British discouraged the formation of a trained class of lawyers in 
Zambia because the ―British considered it politically unwise to train African 
lawyers, fearing that they would turn into agitators for political independence 
upon their return to the colonies‖). 
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almost unheard of before independence.27  In any case, in 1965, the 
new country established its national university, UNZA, and 
UNZA‘s law school started accepting students and gained formal 
recognition in 1967.28 
The following year, the country established the Law Practice 
Institute, to train law graduates for admission to practice.29  In 
1996, the National Assembly reconstituted the Institute as the 
Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education (ZIALE), a 
corporate body with a mandate similar to that of its predecessor.30  
The curriculum at ZIALE involves a full academic year of post-
graduate legal study, at the end of which candidates take 
qualifying exams that determine whether they will be admitted to 
practice.31  Unfortunately, more than forty years after the 
establishment of UNZA‘s law school and the Law Practice 
Institute, the country‘s community of legal practitioners is 
insufficient to meet the needs of the Zambian people, and current 
pass rates at ZIALE hover around ten percent.32  It would be 
unreasonable to expect a country lacking lawyers to be capable of 
building the profession to optimal levels in little more than a 
generation.  Nonetheless, policies at the University and at ZIALE 
have hindered the growth of the profession, and reform could 
promote the development of a larger, stronger community of 
Zambian lawyers.  I will discuss these issues in greater detail in 
Sections 4 and 6.  
Zambia‘s independence constitution established a Court of 
Appeal (called the Supreme Court under the current constitution), 
with essentially unlimited appellate jurisdiction, and a High Court, 
 
27 By 1960, ―there was only one black African lawyer in . . . Tanganyika‖ 
(Tanzania), ten in Kenya, and twenty in Uganda.  Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 
55–56. 
28 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 491 (explaining the 
process by which the School of Law at UNZA was created and recognized). 
29 Id. at 494 n.35. 
30 Historical Background—Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education, ZAMBIA 
INDEX, http://www.bwanji.net/zambiaindex.com/listing.php?idu=5013&needle 
=address&sid=237&page=78&pearid=4992 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012); Interview 
with Palan Mulonda, Director of ZIALE, in Lusaka, Zambia (Nov. 9, 2010) (on file 
with author).  
31 Interview with Palan Mulonda, Director of ZIALE, in Lusaka, Zambia 
(Nov. 9, 2010) (on file with author).  
32 Id. 
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with unlimited original jurisdiction.33  Additionally, statutes 
authorized the creation of subordinate courts, overseen by 
magistrates, and local courts, which administered customary law.34  
As under the colonial system, lawyers were not permitted to 
represent clients in the customary law courts.35  Though the new 
system abolished the dual framework by which black Africans and 
whites were subject to entirely different rules, the retention of 
customary law courts for some issues was a common feature of 
most post-colonial African nations.36  While native Africans in 
colonial Rhodesia arguably had little need for lawyers given the 
primary position of customary law in their daily lives, the sudden 
transition to a largely Western legal system required the creation of 
a new cadre of professionals to assist with the system‘s 
development and administration and to defend the rights of 
people in conflict with that system. 
Each of Zambia‘s three constitutions since independence has 
included provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and 
individual freedoms, and Part III of the current Constitution 
contains these terms, many of which are roughly comparable to 
provisions of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.  
These terms include protections for expressive behavior,37 
protection against unreasonable searches of person and property,38 
and protection from government seizure of property without 
reasonable compensation.39  Crucially, Part III also includes 
 
33 See Muna B. Ndulo & Robert B. Kent, The Constitutions of Zambia, 30 ZAM. 
L.J. 1, 9 (1998) (describing the judicial structure under the 1964 Independence 
Constitution). 
34 Id.  
35 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 489–90.  
36 See Adam Stapleton, Introduction and Overview of Legal Aid in Africa, in 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 3, 4 
(PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW ed., 
2007) (―In most African countries, the formal (state) justice system functions 
alongside traditional and informal (non-state) justice systems.‖).  ―For reasons 
ranging from history to culture, the average African is today subject to at least two 
distinct, and sometimes conflicting, legal systems.  Customary law usually 
regulates family and allied relations, while statutory law regulates other aspects 
of life.‖  Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context 
of Legal Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 387 (2006). 
37 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) arts. 19–
21 (providing protections for freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of assembly and association). 
38 Id. art. 17. 
39 Id. art. 16. 
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safeguards for criminal defendants, guaranteeing a presumption of 
innocence, compulsory process, and a fair trial, conducted within a 
reasonable time by an independent, impartial court.40  
Additionally, Part III guarantees every criminal defendant the right 
to hire a private lawyer of his choosing or to a legal aid lawyer if 
granted under the provisions of the Legal Aid Act.41  Guidelines of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights call for 
legal aid in cases in which the ―interest of justice‖ requires it,42 and 
most African constitutions, like Zambia‘s, recognize the right to 
legal representation, though many specifically disclaim the right to 
legal aid at public expense, and such assistance generally is not 
widely available.43 
Zambia‘s Legal Aid Act gives indigent defendants a definitive 
right to assistance from counsel in all cases before the High Court.44  
Likewise, any criminal appellant in the Supreme Court will be 
provided with a legal aid lawyer if he cannot afford to hire a 
lawyer on his own.45  There is no similar guarantee, however, for 
criminal defendants facing charges in magistrates‘ courts.46  As I 
will discuss in detail, magistrates‘ courts oversee most criminal 
 
40 See id. art. 18 (promulgating rights for defendants charged with criminal 
offenses). 
41  Id. art. 18(2)(d) (providing criminal defendants the right to either retain a 
private attorney or obtain representation via legal aid in accordance with 
provisions enacted by Parliament). 
42 See African Comm‘n on Human and Peoples‘ Rights [ACHPR], Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, § H(a), 
ACHPR Doc DOC/OS(XXX) (2001) (stating that a criminal defendant or party to a 
civil case ―has a right to have legal assistance assigned to him or her in any case 
where the interest of justice so require‖).  This language mirrors language from 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires free legal 
assistance in criminal cases in which the ―interests of justice so require.‖ 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights guarantees a criminal defendant ―the right to be defended by 
counsel of his choice.‖  Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, art. 7(1)(c), 
opened for signature June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
43 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 11–13.  While Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, 
South Africa, and Sudan have some publicly employed legal aid lawyers, 
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, and Uganda do not.  Id. at 12 tbl.2. 
44 See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA § 9. 
45 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
46 See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA § 8 (failing to 
include provisions providing indigent parties facing criminal charges before 
magistrates a guaranteed right to legal counsel). 
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cases in Zambia, and most of the defendants in those cases are 
without representation.47  In civil cases, the Legal Aid Act gives the 
Director of the Legal Aid Board, or a court adjudicating a claim, 
discretion as to whether to grant legal aid to any party.48 
Despite the guarantees of Part III of the Constitution and 
similar conditions in previous Zambian constitutions, political and 
economic realities have frequently reduced those guarantees to 
little more than aspirational entreaties.  Throughout Zambia‘s post-
colonial history, an overbearing executive branch has threatened 
the independence of the judiciary and compromised the sanctity of 
fundamental individual rights, and despite promising early 
developments, Zambia‘s fledgling democracy quickly morphed 
into a centralized, authoritarian state.49  While the independence 
constitution provided for presidential appointment of judges with 
advice from a judicial service commission, the president could 
appoint the chief justice entirely at his own discretion,50 and there 
was initially no requirement that the National Assembly ratify any 
of the president‘s judicial appointments.51  Moreover, although 
judges on the Court of Appeal and the High Court could officially 
be removed only for misbehavior or infirmity, the president could 
appoint sitting judges to non-judicial government positions, 
effectively forcing them to resign.52  Zambia‘s first president, 
Kenneth Kaunda, who remained in power for twenty-seven years, 
used this technique regularly to remove judges when he 
disapproved of the opinions they issued.53 
By 1972, Kaunda abandoned all pretense of pluralistic 
democracy, pushing through a new constitution that officially 
made Zambia a one-party state,54 and throughout President 
 
47 See Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
48 See Legal Aid Act of 1967, Cap. 34, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA §§ 12–13. 
49 See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 11, 14 (explaining that the government 
turned Zambia into a one-party state in 1973, and noting ways in which the one-
party state undermined the Bill of Rights of the 1964 Constitution and other 
liberties). 
50 Id. at 9. 
51 See id. at 18 (noting that parliamentary approval of a president‘s judicial 
appointment was ushered in with the 1991 Constitution). 
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Id.  
54 See B.O. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 222–25 
(1974) (discussing President Kaunda‘s push for Zambia to transition to a one-
party state); see also Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 11–12 (further detailing the 
conditions leading to Zambia‘s transition to a one-party state). 
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Kaunda‘s rule, he kept the country in an official state of 
emergency, which he used to justify regular detentions without 
trials as a means of intimidating opponents of the government.55  
After the reintroduction of multi-party politics under the Third 
Republican Constitution in 1991, President Frederick Chiluba 
continued to declare states of emergency periodically to support 
similar detentions.56  Even under Zambia‘s current constitution, the 
president retains significant control over the judiciary.  Although 
the National Assembly must now ratify appointments to the 
Supreme Court and to the High Court,57 the president can remove 
Supreme Court judges at his discretion as long as the initial 
appointment is for a limited term.58  Additionally, the president 
can have High Court judges removed with the creation of ad hoc 
tribunals, composed of as few as three members of his choosing.59  
Presidential prerogative to remove judges has the potential to 
significantly compromise the independence of the Zambian 
judiciary. 
Executive dominance has been typical of post-colonial African 
states.60  To some extent, this scenario may have been an inevitable 
consequence of the examples highly centralized, authoritarian 
colonial regimes set for their independent successors.61  In any 
 
55 See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 33, at 10 (noting frequent instances of 
requests for judicial review in ―cases involving detention without trial, that is 
detentions on the basis of an executively declared state of emergency‖). 
56 See Isabel Apawo Phiri, President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The 
Christian Nation and Democracy, 33 J. RELIGION AFR. 401, 412 (2003); see also H. 
Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling 
Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 761, 762 (2003). 
57 See CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) arts. 93, 
95 (requiring that the National Assembly confirm the Zambian president‘s judicial 
appointments to the Supreme Court and High Court). 
58 See id. art. 96. 
59 Id. art. 98(3).  
60 See generally Muna Ndulo, Presidentialism in Southern African States and 
Constitutional Restraint on Presidential Power, 26 VT. L. REV. 769 (2002) (analyzing 
generally the prevalence of disproportionately powerful executive branches in 
southern African nations); NWABUEZE, supra note 54 (exploring themes pertaining 
to the role of the executive branch in African states, including its high level of 
dominance compared to other political branches). 
61 The new African regimes inherited ―the full panoply of colonial legislation, 
orders, ordinances, by-laws, and judicial precedents—upon which colonial 
authority had been based.‖  H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review 
and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 
1265 (2006).  Ultimately, it was ―the inherited (subconstitutional) legal order, not 
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case, regular disregard for individual rights has accompanied 
executive supremacy in Zambia, as in other African states.  In some 
measure, this state of affairs may result from the tendency of 
traditional African societies to elevate community well-being 
above personal rights.62  In fact, the primacy of collective welfare 
was at the heart of President Kaunda‘s conception of a humanist 
society.63  As in other African nations, this paradigm required a 
rejection of ―rugged individualism‖ as ―the primacy of the whole is 
emphasized,‖64 and, especially in the early years of independence, 
African leaders often justified suppression of individual rights 
with reference to the collective imperative of economic 
development.65 
Poverty has been at least as significant an obstacle as politics to 
enforcement of basic human rights in Zambia.  Zambia remains 
one of the world‘s poorest countries, with a life expectancy of 
forty-five years,66 sixty-four percent of the population below the 
poverty line,67 and one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
 
the new constitutions, [that] ‗offered African elites real power and the 
bureaucratic machinery with which to exercise it effectively.‘‖  Id. at 1266 (quoting 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an 
African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN 
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 71 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993)). 
62 See Chuma Himonga, State and Individual Perspectives of a Mixed Legal 
System in Southern African Contexts with Special Reference to Personal Law, 25 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 23, 29 (2010); Jeanne M. Woods, Rights as Slogans: A Theory of 
Human Rights Based on African Humanism, 17 NAT‘L BLACK L.J. 52, 55–57 (2003). 
63 See Woods, supra note 62, at 56 (relaying President Kaunda‘s description of 
tribal community as a mutual society that is organized to satisfy all of its 
members‘ basic human needs). 
64 Id. 
65 As described by H. Kwasi Prempeh, the ideology of development came to 
be a wholesale justification for the continuation of the authoritarian aspects of 
colonial regimes and the subversion of rights-based constitutionalism.  Prempeh, 
supra note 61, at 1266–68.  Writing in 1974, B.O. Nwabueze discussed how the 
development rationale had been used to suppress individual rights and freedoms 
and to diminish judicial power, while enhancing the authority of political leaders.  
NWABUEZE, supra note 54, at 354. 
66 Data by Country: Zambia, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org 
/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (providing data regarding life 
expectancy in Zambia as of 2006). 
67 The World Factbook: Zambia, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html 
(last updated Nov. 10, 2011) (providing the percent of Zambian citizens below the 
poverty in 2006). 
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world.68  Africa‘s AIDS pandemic compounds Zambian poverty, 
and over fourteen percent of the Zambian population is currently 
HIV positive.69  As a consequence of Zambia‘s poverty, widespread 
government corruption continues to plague the country.  Low 
salaries have exacerbated this problem amongst the country‘s 
police force, which has been known to require bribes to commence 
investigations, to extort money from victims of crimes, and to 
accept bribes from suspects in exchange for their release from 
custody.70  Similarly, judicial corruption has inhibited the 
development of a truly independent judiciary.71  Moreover, the 
lack of adequate judicial resources, including insufficient numbers 
of trained personnel, has contributed to prolonged pre-trial 
detentions, with some defendants waiting for years for trials.72  
Adding to this problem, prison officials regularly alter documents 
to suggest prisoners have had court hearings when they have not, 
often because the prisons lack the money to buy fuel to transport 
prisoners to court.73  
Meanwhile, human rights abuses by Zambian law enforcement 
are common.  Police frequently torture people in custody to coerce 
confessions, and reports of recent abuses have included beatings 
with metal bars and electrified rods and the hanging of prisoners 
upside down to torture them.74  Additionally, police have, on 
occasion, demanded sex from female detainees in exchange for 
their release and have raped female prisoners.75  The police officers 
 
68 See id. (ranking Zambia number 142 out of 199 in a list of countries 
arranged from the lowest to the highest unemployment rate).  
69 Background Note: Zambia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov 
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2359.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2011). 
70 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Zambia (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld 
/publisher,USDOS,,ZMB,4b9e52a8c,0.html [hereinafter Zambia 2009] (discussing 
Zambia‘s human rights record). 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See Zambia: Police Brutality, Torture Rife, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 7, 
2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/03/zambia-police-brutality-torture-
rife (arguing that these incidents should be investigated and that the perpetrators 
should be held accountable).  
75 Id.; see, e.g., Moses Kuwema, Sichilima Warns Policemen Sleeping with 
Detainees, THE POST, Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.postzambia.com/post-
read_article.php?articleId=15684 (noting the reports of police officers demanding 
intercourse from females arrested for loitering). 
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who have committed these crimes have done so largely with 
impunity.76 
Overall, conditions for those in prison in Zambia are 
horrendous.  Prison buildings house several times the number of 
inmates they were built to hold, and cells are often so crowded that 
lack of floor space forces prisoners to sleep in shifts.77  This 
overcrowding is largely attributable to the high percentage of 
remand prisoners awaiting trial without bail, and similar 
overcrowding plagues prisons across the continent, often because 
remand prisoners who cannot afford to pay sureties to secure pre-
trial release end up waiting for years before their trials begin.78  In 
Zambia, inmates in solitary confinement are regularly stripped 
naked and placed in windowless cells filled up to their calves with 
water contaminated with their own feces.79  Understaffing at the 
prisons leads guards to delegate authority to prisoners, designated 
as ―cell captains,‖ who enforce their own crude justice on the 
population of inmates.80  Outbreaks of tuberculosis turn the prison 
complexes into literal death traps.81  These sorts of devastating 
prison conditions are common in many other African countries as 
well.82 
Given threats to the independence of the judiciary, a history of 
human rights abuses, and devastating resource scarcity, access to 
qualified lawyers is crucially important to Zambians dealing with 
 
76 Zambia 2009, supra note 70. 
77 See Celia W. Dugger, Report Calls Zambia’s Prisons ‘Death Traps,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/africa 
/28zambia.html. 
78 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 8–10 (describing similar conditions in Benin, 
Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, and Nigeria). 
79 Dugger, supra note 77; Zambia: Police Brutality, Torture Rife, supra note 74 
(providing selected accounts from Zambian prisoners about treatment they 
experienced in police custody). 
80 Dugger, supra note 77. 
81 Id. 
82 In 1996, representatives from forty African countries and seven other 
countries promulgated the Kampala Declaration, recognizing widespread 
inhumane conditions in African prisons, largely as a result of overcrowding.  
PENAL REFORM INT‘L, Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa and 
Plan of Action, Sept. 19–Sept. 21, 1996, available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/files/rep-1996-kampala-declaration-en.pdf; see also 
Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in 
Africa, pmbl. (Nov. 22–24, 2004), available at http://www.penalreform.org 
/files/rep-2004-lilongwe-declaration-en.pdf (identifying the poor conditions of 
prisons in African nations). 
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legal conflict, and especially to those engaged in adversarial 
proceedings against the government.  Yet, as discussed throughout 
this Article, most Zambians do not have meaningful access to legal 
representation, and the vast majority of criminal defendants in 
Zambia do not have lawyers.  With only one lawyer for every 
18,000 people in Zambia, it would be impossible, under the best of 
circumstances, to provide for the country‘s legal needs.  In the 
United States, there is about one lawyer for every 260 people,83 and 
in many countries in Europe, the ratios are similarly high.84  
Throughout Africa, however, the numbers of practicing lawyers 
are strikingly low.  Table 1, on the following page, illustrates the 
problem. 
This is not to suggest that African countries necessarily require 
lawyers in numbers proportionate to the world‘s most developed 
economies.  Yet the numbers across Africa are clearly insufficient.  
As in Zambia, lawyers in most sub-Saharan countries concentrate 
heavily in urban centers, leaving large portions of the population 
with geographical, as well as financial, barriers to legal 
representation.85  Moreover, even in urban areas, many criminal 
defendants do not have lawyers,86 and most people with civil 
claims cannot afford the costs of representation or litigation.87  
Increasing the size of the African bar would help to address these 
problems. 
 
83 According to the American Bar Association, there were 1,180,386 active 
lawyers in the United States in 2009.  Total National Lawyer Counts 1878–2011, ABA 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/Pub
licDocuments/total_national_lawyer_counts_18782011_1.xls (last visited Feb. 14, 
2012).   In the same year, the population of the United States was approximately 
305,500,000.  See U.S. Population, 2009: 305 Million and Counting, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Dec. 31, 2008 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles 
/2008/12/31/us-population-2009-305-million-and-counting. 
84 See COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUR., Number of Lawyers in CCBE 
Member Bars, available at http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload 
/NTCdocument/table_number_lawyers1_1179905628.pdf (last updated in 2006) 
(breaking down the demographics of lawyers who are members of a bar or 
registered). 
85 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 13 (discussing barriers to legal 
representation in sub-Saharan Africa). 
86 Id. 
87 See African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Dakar 
Declaration and Recommendations, §9 (1999), http://www.chr.up.ac.za 
/index.php/documents-by-theme/fair-trial.html (stating that governments 
should provide legal assistance to indigent persons to make the right of a fair trial 
more effective). 
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TABLE 1 
Country Number of 
Lawyers 
Population Ratio of Lawyers 
to People 
Botswana88 190 1,600,000 1:8,421 




3,000 60,000,000 1:20,000 
Ethiopia91 434 67,000,000 1:154,378 
The Gambia 13092 1,705,21293 1:13,117 
Ghana 2,50094 23,837,26195 1:9,535 
Kenya 7,00096 39,802,01597 1:5,686 
Malawi98 350 12,000,000 1:34,286 
Niger99 77 11,000,000 1:142,857 
 





92 GAMBIA BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.accessgambia.com/extra/gambia-
bar-association.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).  However, 40 to 50 of these 
lawyers are working outside of Gambia.  Id. 
93 Data by Country: Gambia, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101202092922/http://data.worldbank.org//country//gambia (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival 
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). 
94 Training of Ghanaian Lawyers, GHANA BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.ghanabar.org/about-us/training-ghanaian-lawyers.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
95  Data by Country: Ghana, WORLD BANK, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101202154035/http://data.worldbank.org//cou
ntry//ghana (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on 
Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law). 
96 See Members Overview, THE LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101019040643/http://www.lsk.or.ke/about-
lsk/overview/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on 
Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law). 
97  Data by Country: Kenya, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101202154852/http://data.worldbank.org//country//kenya (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival copy 
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). 
98 Stapleton, supra note 36, at 12. 
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
Country Number of 
Lawyers 
Population Ratio of Lawyers 
to People 
Nigeria 55,000100 154,728,892101 1:2,813 
Rwanda102  420 8,000,000 1:19,048 
Senegal103 300 10,000,000 1:33,333 
Sudan104 2,000 33,000,000 1:16,500 
Tanzania 1,188105 43,739,051106 1:36,834 
Uganda 1,200107 32,709,865108 1:27,258 
 
In Zambia, the growth of the legal profession has been 
distressingly slow.  Between 2005, the first year for which the Law 
Association of Zambia has existing records, and December of 2010, 
the private bar in Zambia increased by only 153 lawyers, from 578 
 
99 Id. 
100  About NBA, NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20100904024624/http://www.nigerianbar.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=1&Itemid=6 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching 
internet url on Internet Archive) (archival copy on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). 
101 Data by Country: Nigeria, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101202160324/http://data.worldbank.org//country//nigeria (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival 
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). 
102  Stapleton, supra note 36, at 12. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Roll of Advocates, TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY, http://www.tls.or.tz 
/pdf/rolls.pdf (showing the names and dates of admission of advocates into the 
Society).  
106 Data by Country—Tanzania, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org 
/web/20101202161926/http://data.worldbank.org//country//tanzania (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) 
(archival copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law). 
107 See UGANDA LAW SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 2010 10 (2010) 
available at http://www.uls.or.ug/uploads/ULS%20ANNUAL%20REPORT 
%202009-2010.pdf (stating the number of paid members of the Uganda Law 
Society who are registered lawyers). 
108 Data by Country—Uganda, WORLD BANK, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101202162306/http://data.worldbank.org//country//uganda (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012) (accessed by searching internet url on Internet Archive) (archival 
copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law). 
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to 731.109  Yet in that same period, UNZA‘s school of law has 
graduated between eighty and one hundred students per year.110  
High failure rates at ZIALE largely account for this disparity. 
Compounding the detrimental effects of the scarcity of 
Zambian lawyers, the Legal Practitioners Act prevents many 
people who might otherwise be able to obtain civil legal services 
from doing so by prohibiting the use of contingency fees.111  
Without that possibility, and with many Zambian lawyers 
charging hundreds of dollars an hour, their services are 
unattainable for the great majority of Zambians.  Furthermore, 
with only twenty-four lawyers at the Legal Aid Board and tens of 
thousands of new criminal cases entered in magistrates‘ courts 
each year, the plight of Zambian criminal defendants is dire.  In a 
promising development, 131 private practitioners have signed up 
with the Law Association of Zambia‘s Legal Aid Committee to 
participate in a program to take referrals of High Court criminal 
cases from the Legal Aid Board.112  Nonetheless, this program 
began operating only in mid-2010, and it is still too early to 
determine the extent of its impact.113 
Meanwhile, only a small handful of private, non-profit 
organizations offer direct in-court legal representation.114  Two of 
 
109 Figures available at the Law Association of Zambia offices, viewed on 
December 6, 2010. 
110 Interview with Anne Chanda, Acting Dean of the University of Zambia 
School of Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 28, 2010) (on file with author). 
111 See Legal Practitioners Act, The Legal Practitioners’ Practice Rules, §8 (2002), 
available at http://www.laz.org.zm/legal_prac_act.htm (stating that a practitioner 
retained to prosecute or defend an action cannot arrange to receive a contingency 
fee for that proceeding). 
112 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7. 
113 Id.; Interview with Likando Kalaluka, Convener of the Law Association of 
Zambia Legal Aid Committee, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 21, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
114 See generally Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of 
Law, & Danish Institute for Human Rights, Mapping of Legal Aid Service 
Providers in Zambia (Feb. 6, 2008) (unpublished report, on file with author).  
Much of the material in Section 6 below is based on information gathered during 
an exercise to map legal aid services in Zambia, conducted in late 2007 by the 
University of Zambia School of Law, the Paralegal Alliance Network, and the 
Danish Institute for Human Rights.  As a lecturer at the University of Zambia 
School of Law in 2007, I participated in the mapping exercise by facilitating 
interviews and survey distribution in Northwestern Province and Copperbelt 
Province.  The project was funded by Deutsch Gesellschaft fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (the German government‘s international development 
program), the Royal Danish Embassy to Zambia, and the Royal Swedish Embassy 
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those, the Legal Resources Foundation and the National Legal Aid 
Clinic for Women, have largely ceased their operations as donor 
fatigue has led to funding crises.115  A third, the International 
Justice Mission, provides civil assistance, primarily in land 
grabbing cases.116  A number of organizations use paralegals, 
usually retained as volunteers, to conduct sensitization programs 
to educate communities on their rights and to offer particularized 
legal advice to individual clients.  Nonetheless, these organizations 
lack adequate funding for human or material resources, and most 
paralegals have no supervision from lawyers.117  
Despite these limitations, there is much potential for progress.  
While some of the problems with the country‘s justice system are 
intractably linked to Zambia‘s extreme dearth of resources, Zambia 
could provide better access to legal representation through a series 
of achievable policy reforms.  In the next section, I will examine in 
detail the operations of Zambia‘s westernized courts, with a focus 
on the adequacy of legal representation for criminal defendants.  
Defendants in these courts receive some assistance from legal aid 
lawyers and from the private bar.  Nonetheless, most are not 
represented, and the consequences are dire. 
3. ZAMBIA‘S WESTERN COURT SYSTEM 
Though the High Court automatically refers unrepresented 
criminal defendants to the Legal Aid Board, subordinate courts, 
presided over by magistrates, oversee most criminal cases in 
Zambia, and the great majority of defendants in those cases go 
unrepresented.  And while magistrates‘ courts regularly sentence 
defendants to years in prison with hard labor, indigent criminal 
defendants have no definitive right to a lawyer in those courts.  As 
a result, the Legal Aid Board often has to make difficult decisions 
about which applications from subordinate court defendants it can 
accept.118  The Board makes those decisions based on a 
 
to Zambia.  The project led to the compilation of a final report, completed in 
February 2008, cited above. 
115 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7. 
116 Id. 
117 Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, & 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 30. 
118 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3 (―With subordinate court 
cases, that is where we have to decide which cases really, really need to be placed 
with us.‖). 
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combination of the defendant‘s financial need and the complexity 
and seriousness of the case.119  Furthermore, most defendants in 
magistrates‘ courts are likely unaware that applying for legal aid is 
even an option, and magistrates and prosecutors rarely advise 
defendants to seek counsel or to apply for legal aid.120  Asked what 
he would do with unlimited resources, Mr. Ngulube, the Acting 
Director of the Legal Aid Board, said, ―If I had the choice, I would 
put more lawyers in Subordinate Court.‖121 
Statistics available from the High Court‘s central registry and 
from the Legal Aid Board reveal the severity of the problem.  In 
2009, magistrates‘ courts in Zambia took pleas in more than 23,697 
new criminal cases.122  Meanwhile, available data on new criminal 
cases, including appeals, in the High Court show that the Court 
dealt with only a small fraction of the criminal caseload of the 
magistrates‘ courts in the same year.123  The recent commencement 
of operations of the Law Association of Zambia‘s Legal Aid 
Committee may significantly ease the Legal Aid Board‘s burden 
with regard to High Court cases.  In fact, 131 private practitioners, 
close to a fifth of Zambia‘s private bar, have signed up to 
participate in the program.124  Participating lawyers will earn about 
$900 from a government-sponsored legal aid fund for each case 
they handle through the Committee.  While it is still too early to 
determine the impact of the Committee, and while the payment 
structure may encourage speedy disposition of cases rather than 
high-quality representation,125 this LAZ initiative could 
 
119 Id. 
120 Id.; see also Interview with Alice Sitali, in Lusaka, Zambia (Sept. 20, 2010) 
(on file with author) (―You‘ll find that the prosecutor is sometimes acting as 
prosecutor and also counseling the defendants, but just advising the defendant to 
plead guilty.‖). 
121 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
122 Data collected from the High Court registry on Oct. 27 and Oct. 28, 2010.  
The registry had data for eight of Zambia‘s nine provinces.  However, there was 
no information available for Southern Province.  Additionally, statistics were 
missing for the Mumbwa Subordinate Court in Central Province. 
123 The High Court registry revealed a total of 1137 new cases in the High 
Court, including appeals from subordinate courts, in 2009.  This information also 
did not include any cases from Southern Province. 
124 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7. 
125 Lawyers who accept cases through the Legal Aid Committee receive 2 
million kwacha upon initiating representation and another 2 million kwacha once 
the case is complete.  This secondary payment, which does not depend on the 
outcome of the case, may provide lawyers with incentives to dispense with cases 
quickly rather than to represent clients to the best of their abilities. 
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significantly improve the quality of representation of criminal 
defendants in the High Court. 
Even so, the Legal Aid Committee takes only High Court 
cases,126 and, with only twenty-four lawyers, the overworked and 
understaffed Legal Aid Board cannot possibly expect to effectively 
represent the huge numbers of criminal defendants facing charges 
each year in magistrates‘ courts.  In fact, the Legal Aid Board‘s 
various offices took, at most, 302 criminal cases from magistrates‘ 
courts in 2009.127  Overall, the Board took between 2492 and 2678 
cases in 2009, including all civil and criminal cases in all courts, 
and any assistance the Legal Aid Committee offers to lighten this 
load will be insufficient to provide for the possibility of 
representation for the majority of people facing criminal charges 
across the country, especially in magistrates‘ courts.128 
Yet it is clear that defendants confronting charges in Zambian 
magistrates‘ courts face critical threats to their most fundamental 
rights.  An examination of case data from Lusaka District is 
revealing.  First, scrutiny of the plea books for six of fourteen 
magistrates in the district for the first six months of 2009 provided 
information on 765 cases.129  Of those, 558 cases had reached their 
 
126 Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113. 
127 The Legal Aid Board‘s central registry indicates that the Board accepted a 
total of 246 criminal cases in magistrates‘ courts for all the Board‘s offices other 
than Mansa in 2009.  The Ndola office took seven criminal cases from magistrates‘ 
courts, the Kitwe office accepted forty-nine, the Lusaka office accepted eighty-
nine; the Livingstone office accepted forty-two; the Chipata office accepted fifteen; 
the Solwezi office took forty-one; and the Kabwe office accepted three.  Records 
from Mansa show that the office received applications for representation in fifty-
six criminal cases in magistrates‘ courts in 2009, but the records do not show how 
many of those cases the Mansa office accepted. 
128 The Legal Aid Board‘s central registry shows the Ndola office accepted 
173 criminal cases from all courts in 2009 and 26 civil cases; the Kitwe office 
accepted 259 criminal cases and 88 civil cases; the Lusaka office accepted 834 
criminal cases and 86 civil cases; the Livingstone office accepted 290 criminal cases 
and 37 civil cases; the Chipata office accepted 288 criminal cases and 34 civil cases; 
the Solwezi office accepted 123 criminal cases and 38 civil cases; the Kabwe office 
accepted 160 criminal cases and 6 civil cases; Mansa received 175 applications for 
criminal representation and eleven applications for civil representation, but the 
records do not reveal how many of those cases the Mansa office accepted. 
129 This included 80 cases before the Honorable A.M. Chulu; 243 cases before 
the Honorable Hamaundu; 120 cases before the Honorable W. Banda; 150 cases 
before the Honorable K. Mulife; 72 cases before the Honorable M. Makalile; and 
100 cases before the Honorable Chilembo.  Plea books for the remaining eight 
magistrates in the district were either filled in sporadically, making it impossible 
to rely on the data, or were unavailable after repeated attempts to access them 
through marshals employed to assist the magistrates and to keep records. 
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conclusion in magistrates‘ courts by late September 2010.130  In 290 
of those 558 cases, defendants received prison sentences or were 
sent to juvenile detention centers,131 and 241 of the cases involved 
sentences of prison time with hard labor.132  One hundred twenty-
four of the cases included sentences of one year or more of prison 
time.133 
Assessment of active case files is also revealing.  Examination 
in late September 2010 of the active files for ten of the fourteen 
magistrates in Lusaka district, including 717 cases, shows that 
defendants took their initial pleas in eighty-five percent of these 
cases in 2009 or 2010.  Nonetheless, a significant minority of cases 
have languished much longer.  Approximately eight percent of 
active cases for the ten magistrates began in 2007 or earlier, and 
sixteen of the cases began at least five calendar years before the 
date of inspection.  Additionally, none of these data accounts for 
remand prisoners who may have spent considerable periods of 
time in prison before magistrates took their initial pleas. 
Perhaps ironically, cases in magistrates‘ courts may take longer 
for those defendants lucky enough to obtain the services of the 
Legal Aid Board.  Of the 302 magistrates‘ court criminal cases the 
board accepted in 2009, only sixty-seven cases were complete by 
the end of the year.  In some districts, the figures were particularly 
striking.  For example, of the eighty-nine criminal cases the Legal 
Aid Board accepted in 2009 from Lusaka District magistrates‘ 
courts, the government withdrew the charges in one case, and 
none of the remaining eighty-eight cases were complete by the end 
of 2009.  This trend may, however, be unsurprising.  Motions by 
 
130 This figure included 46 of eighty cases begun in Honorable Chulu‘s court 
in the first half of 2009; 214 of 243 cases in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 79 of 120 
cases in Honorable Banda‘s court; 102 of 150 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 50 of 72 
in Honorable Makalile‘s court; and 67 of 100 cases in Honorable Chilembo‘s court. 
131 This figure included 16 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s 
court; 115 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 52 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s 
court; 56 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 16 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s 
court; and 35 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court. 
132 This figure included 12 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s 
court; 104 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 37 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s 
court; 50 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 10 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s 
court; and 28 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court. 
133 This figure included 10 of the 46 cases completed in Honorable Chulu‘s 
court; 58 of 214 in Honorable Hamaundu‘s court; 4 of 79 in Honorable Banda‘s 
court; 28 of 102 in Honorable Mulife‘s court; 6 of 50 in Honorable Makalile‘s court; 
and 18 of 67 in Honorable Chilembo‘s court. 
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represented clients may slow the procession of a case, and the 
Legal Aid Board tends to accept cases in magistrates‘ courts only 
for relatively serious and complex matters.134  In any case, 
defendants who are able to attract the attention of the Legal Aid 
Board are certainly better off with lawyers than without; the 
average criminal defendant in Zambian courts has little education 
and little concept of his legal rights or how to navigate the court 
system.  As significant as any other benefit a lawyer may confer, 
lawyers may be more likely to be able to obtain bail than 
unrepresented criminal defendants. 
For those without lawyers, seeking bail can be difficult, for 
magistrates have broad discretion to deny bail, even for non-
violent offenders and without any obligation to articulate reasons 
for that denial.135  Ultimately, Likando Kalaluka, the Convener of 
the Law Association‘s Legal Aid Committee, attributes the high 
percentage of Zambian prisoners who have not had trials to this 
unfettered discretion, in addition to the lack of legal representation 
for most defendants in magistrates‘ courts.136  Such discretion is 
particularly troubling in light of the lack of professional training of 
most Zambian magistrates, over seventy percent of whom are not 
qualified as lawyers.137  For now, in any case, defendants in 
magistrates‘ courts are unlikely to be lucky enough to attract the 
attention of the Legal Aid Board and unlikely to be able to afford 
private representation.  Any serious attempt to improve access to 
justice in Zambia must include measures to reduce the number of 
people sentenced to years of imprisonment without the benefit of 
legal representation. 
Zambians with civil claims are equally unlikely to be able to 
afford lawyers.  With high hourly rates as the general norm, most 
Zambians have no choice but to act as their own advocates or to 
forgo pursuing litigation as a means of enforcing their rights.  A 
significant minority of the Legal Aid Board‘s caseload is civil, and 
 
134 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
135 Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113. 
136 Id. (―We should have it mandatory that anytime someone appears in court 
on a bailable offense, the court should grant bail unless the state has a specific 
reason why bail should not be granted.‖).  But, citing the shortage of Zambian 
lawyers, Mr. Kalaluka said that he does not believe it is currently feasible to 
provide most criminal defendants with lawyers. 
137 Zambia, 2009, supra note 70 (describing how at the end of 2009, only 41 of 
150 Zambian magistrates were qualified as lawyers, and the rest were lay 
magistrates). 
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in 2009, the Board accepted between 365 and 376 civil cases across 
the country,138 most of which involved disputes over land.139  
Similarly, the International Justice Mission handles some land 
claims for Zambians who cannot afford to hire their own 
lawyers.140  However, these avenues for obtaining legal assistance 
are available to only an extreme minority of Zambians with 
credible civil claims.  There is no reasonable prospect of that 
changing while the country‘s prohibition on contingency fees 
remains intact and without dramatic growth in the population of 
Zambian lawyers.  In Section 7 of this Article, I will suggest 
potential measures to increase the availability of legal 
representation, including strategies for growing the Zambian legal 
profession and possibilities for improving the availability of legal 
assistance given the current dearth of lawyers.  In the next section 
of the Article, I will examine the causes for the current paucity of 
Zambian lawyers.  
4. CAUSES OF THE SCARCITY OF ZAMBIAN LAWYERS 
With no Zambian lawyers at the time of independence, the task 
of developing the country‘s legal profession would be daunting 
under the best of circumstances.  Almost overnight, Zambians 
faced a transition from a system in which customary legal 
principles governed almost all of their affairs to one in which 
Western-style courts were intended to oversee most major disputes 
both between individuals and between individuals and the state.  
Because colonial policies had largely excluded native Africans 
from engaging with British law and from accessing legal 
education, the new nation would have to build its legal profession 
from whole cloth.  In 1964, as Zambia was establishing its new 
 
138 See supra text accompanying note 128.  In addition to Zambia, South Africa 
provides legal aid in some civil cases.  See also Brian Brophy, A Civil Right to 
Counsel Through the States Using California’s Efficiency Project as a Model Toward a 
Civil Gideon, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 39, 41 (2011).  The Lilongwe 
Declaration, with input from delegates of twenty-one African countries, also 
contemplates the use of civil legal aid.  See PENAL REFORM INT‘L, supra note 82.  
Additionally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights urges the 
provision of civil legal aid in cases in which the ―interest of justice‖ requires it.  
See African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, § H(a)–(b), 
Doc/OS(XXX)247 (2001). 
139 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
140 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7. 
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legal order, the country had no university, let alone a law school, 
and huge investments in educational infrastructure would be 
necessary to begin the difficult work ahead.  Close to fifty years 
after independence, an analysis of obstacles to growth of the 
Zambian legal profession must still include a heavy focus on legal 
education. 
In the first part of this section, I will discuss the state of the 
Zambian legal academy.  Resource limitations and poor policy 
choices in that academy have hindered the admission of new 
lawyers to the Zambian bar.  Meanwhile, around ninety percent of 
each new class at ZIALE has failed the bar admissions course in 
recent years.141  Problems with the organization and administration 
of ZIALE have also likely suppressed growth of the Zambian legal 
profession.  I will discuss these issues in the second part of this 
section. 
4.1. Legal Education in Zambia 
4.1.1. State of the Zambian Legal Academy 
As mentioned above, Zambia established its national 
university, UNZA, in 1965 and the UNZA School of Law in 1967.  
Until 2005, the School of Law remained the country‘s only law 
school, and until late 2010, it was the only school in the country 
from which ZIALE would accept candidates for the bar.142  Thus, 
discussion of the Zambian legal academy necessarily entails a 
heavy focus on the UNZA School of Law.  Interviews with local 
lawyers and with the Acting Dean of the School of Law revealed a 
common belief that legal educators in Zambia have failed, at least 
in some respects, to adequately prepare law students for entrance 
into the profession.143  Deeper examination of the Zambian legal 
 
141 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
142 ZIALE refused to grant admission to students from Zambian universities 
other than UNZA until the High Court ordered the Institute to do so.  Although 
the High Court ruled that ZIALE must begin admitting students from Zambia 
Open University in mid-2009, students from Zambia‘s newer law schools did not 
begin matriculating until September 2010.  Id.; Zambia Open University Law 
Students Win Major Legal Battle, TIMES ZAMBIA, July 2, 2009, at 4, available at 
NewsBank, inc., Record No. TOZA72497950. 
143 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110.  When asked about the 
cause of high failure rates at ZIALE, Mr. Ngulube, Mrs. Sitali, and Mr. Kalaluka 
each separately noted that they perceived a decline in the quality of legal 
education in Zambia.  See also Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113; 
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academy confirms that popular conception.  Nonetheless, 
staggering economic challenges have undeniably contributed to 
and compounded the problem. 
At the time of the founding of the UNZA School of Law in 
1967, the University Senate set out broad and ambitious goals for 
the new school.  According to the law school‘s 1970 handbook, the 
objectives of the school were to provide Zambia with lawyers with 
skills at least equal to the best lawyers from abroad, but better 
suited to the needs of a developing country like Zambia; to help 
develop and build the legal system of the newly independent 
country; and to make the school‘s staff and students generally 
available to improve community welfare.144  Forty years later, the 
school has fallen short of these lofty ideals. 
The reasons for this failure are numerous, though much of the 
problem is traceable to the unavailability of public resources for 
tertiary education in Zambia.  Specifically, the law school is 
dramatically understaffed, faces chronic absenteeism from some 
faculty members, and has a dire shortage of books and other 
educational materials.  Moreover, frequent strikes by University 
faculty shut the school down, sometimes for weeks at a time.145  
Although a lack of adequate funding inevitably makes efficient 
operation a struggle, the School might resolve some of its problems 
through pedagogical innovation and policy reforms to enhance the 
impact of the School‘s faculty. 
Perhaps the most serious problem the University of Zambia‘s 
law school faces is a faculty shortage.  While the School has an 
official establishment of twenty-five full-time faculty members, 
including two professors and twenty-three lecturers, there are 
currently only nine full-time teachers on the faculty, including 
eight lecturers and one professor.146  Meanwhile, 371 students were 
enrolled at the school in the fall of 2010, and in some semesters 
there are over 400 students.147 
 
Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3; Interview with Alice Sitali, supra 
note 120. 
144 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 491 (citing Univ. of 
Zambia, Law School Handbook 1 (1970)). 
145 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, Lecturer, University of Zambia School of 
Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (Oct. 28, 2010) (on file with author). 
146 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
147 Id. 
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Operating with less than half the establishment of law teachers 
would present significant difficulties even if all members of the 
faculty were fully engaged with their responsibilities to the School.  
However, according to Anne Chanda, Acting Dean of the 
University of Zambia School of Law, this has not been the case.  
Law teachers skipping their own classes has become a chronic 
problem at the school, and some faculty members miss large 
percentages of their assigned classes each semester, frequently 
without giving advance notice to students.148  In general, according 
to Chanda, faculty who spend little time at school are usually 
devoting their working hours to private practice.149 
The lack of sufficient numbers of law faculty at UNZA and the 
unavailability of those who are on the faculty are problems that 
have not been lost on UNZA‘s law students.  A survey of seventy-
four of ninety-five full-time students in their second-to-last-year of 
law school was revealing.  In response to an open-ended survey 
question about the biggest problems at the School, over one-third 
of students mentioned unavailability of faculty, often specifically 
citing faculty skipping their classes and office hours.150  Twenty-
eight percent cited insufficient numbers of faculty as a concern.151  
The shortage of full-time faculty and the rampant absenteeism of 
theoretically full-time teachers may have contributed to low 
morale amongst students and to a souring of relations between 
students and their teachers.  Forty-five percent of the students 
surveyed mentioned intimidation by faculty or overt disrespect for 
students as one of the School‘s most serious problems.152 
In part, these problems are a result of simple economic reality.  




150 I distributed survey questions to all students present in a Human Rights 
class, in which the entire third-year class of full-time students was enrolled.  
Seventy-four of ninety-five students were present in class, and 100% of those 
present responded to the survey.  The question on institutional challenges read as 
follows: ―What are the most significant problems at your law school?  Please 
provide as much detail as possible in the space below.‖  Twenty-six of the 
seventy-four students mentioned unavailability of faculty as a problem at the 
school.  Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School of 
Law, in Lusaka, Zambia (October 7, 2010) (on file with author). 
151 Twenty-one of seventy-four students mentioned an insufficient number of 
faculty members as a problem.  Id. 
152 Thirty-three of seventy-four students mentioned disrespect and 
intimidation of students by faculty as a problem.  Id. 
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$1000 a month from the University, private consulting jobs and 
private law practice in Zambia can be much more lucrative, and 
some local law firms charge hundreds of dollars an hour for their 
services.153  Similar problems afflict the law faculties of other 
African countries, where law teachers often earn as little as $400 to 
$600 a month from their law schools but have corporations and law 
firms competing for their time and willing to remunerate them 
generously.154  Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that 
some members of African law faculties feel compelled to devote 
most of their time to private practice, even if doing so means 
shirking law school responsibilities. 
The disparity between private-sector income for qualified 
lawyers and salaries for members of the law faculty also makes 
recruiting qualified new faculty difficult, and, again, the problem is 
common throughout much of the continent.155  Those who do join 
African law faculties often stay for only a few years, and the high 
turnover rate prevents schools from maintaining a focused, 
coherent sense of direction.156  This has certainly been the case at 
UNZA.157  Related to and compounding the problem of low 
salaries for African law teachers, the profession has failed to garner 
the prestige associated with law teaching in the West, and the best 
African legal minds often feel they can have greater impacts in the 
private sector or in civil service positions.158 
 
153 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Misozi 
Lwatula, supra note 145. 
154 See Thomas F. Geraghty & Emmanuel K. Quansah, African Legal Education: 
A Missed Opportunity and Suggestions for Change: A Call for Renewed Attention to a 
Neglected Means of Securing Human Rights and Legal Predictability, 5 LOY. U. CHI. 
INT‘L L. REV. 87, 98–99 (2007) (emphasizing that the huge disparity between faculty 
salaries and those of private sector lawyers and consultants makes it extremely 
difficult for faculty to teach full-time). 
155 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 501 (indicating that 
impoverished law schools face difficulties in recruiting and retaining law teachers, 
which in turn has affected the quality of legal education in Africa). 
156 See id. at 502 (noting that, as bright young law teachers have little 
incentive to teach in the long term, African law schools lack the ―driving core‖ 
that accompanies stability in faculty and resources).  At the University of Zambia 
School of Law, five people who had been full-time faculty members in mid-2006 
were no longer on the faculty by the end of 2010, representing over half of the full-
time faculty at the law school at the later date.  Interview with Anne Chanda, 
supra note 110. 
157 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
158 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 71–72 (listing shrinking university 
resources and inadequate faculty salaries as the primary reasons that teaching law 
in Africa is no longer deemed a desirable career path). 
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The economic incentives driving the best legal minds away 
from teaching and pulling those who are willing to teach away 
from their academic duties help to perpetuate a self-reinforcing 
cycle.  As members of the law faculty abandon their 
responsibilities to students, the quality of education declines, and 
graduates of local law schools are less prepared than they should 
be as they matriculate into the bar admission course at ZIALE.  
Low pass rates at ZIALE limit the size of the community of 
lawyers, thus keeping legal fees high and ensuring the 
continuation of the incentives that limit the size and dedication of 
Zambian law faculties.  
Unfortunately, University policy has reinforced external 
pressures on law school faculty to spread their time amongst 
numerous endeavors.  Like most other African universities,159 
UNZA pays equal salaries to faculty of all disciplines.  This policy 
represents a failure to respond to the market for legal services that 
draws high-quality lawyers away from academic careers.  Instead 
of raising the salaries of law teachers, however, UNZA chose a 
compromise that ensures an absentee faculty.  For the first twenty-
seven years of the School‘s operation, UNZA rules prohibited 
faculty at the School of Law from practicing, but in 1994, the policy 
changed, allowing lecturers and professors to open their own law 
firms.160  Before that shift in policy, the School of Law had a truly 
full-time faculty, but now it has become common for many ―full-
time‖ teachers at the School to spend weeks at a time away from 
campus, even in the middle of the semester.161  Again, the problem 
has been common throughout the continent, yet, according to at 
least one estimate, schools that have tried to prohibit their faculties 
from spending large amounts of time engaging in outside 
consulting projects or in private practice have driven away their 
best teachers.162 
 
159 See Geraghty & Quansah, supra note 154, at 99 (discussing the ―peculiar‖ 
salary structure of African universities paying all professors the same regardless 
of discipline). 
160 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
161 ―When I was a student, we used to have truly full-time faculty members.  
We used to have lecturers seated, waiting for us anytime.  They were here the 
whole time,‖ Mrs. Chanda said.  Id. 
162 See Dauphinais, supra note 13 at 72 (quoting Yash Ghai, Law, Development 
and African Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 750, 774–75 (1987)) (―Some countries or 
universities have tried to ban or regulate outside work, but this, if effective, drives 
the best people out of teaching.‖). 
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Dramatic growth in the student body has compounded the 
effects of the shortage of faculty and unavailability of those who 
are ostensibly full-time teachers.  Until the mid-1990‘s, there were 
never more than forty students in a class at UNZA‘s law school, 
but those numbers have more than doubled since that time.163  This 
growth has mirrored a similar enlargement of the student body of 
the University but has not been accompanied by an increase in 
material or human resources.164  Likewise, law schools throughout 
Africa have faced pressure to admit more and more students in 
recent years, often doubling their student bodies without 
increasing the sizes of their faculties or of their libraries, which has 
diminished the quality of African legal education.165 
Ultimately, Acting Dean Chanda attributes much of the 
problem to personal failures by some members of the faculty to 
live up to their responsibilities.  ―The problem of people not 
attending classes and not marking on time has been seated with 
certain individuals, year in and year out.  It‘s a question of 
commitment,‖ Chanda said.166  According to Chanda, for faculty 
unwilling to teach their classes or attend office hours, ―it‘s immoral 
to receive a salary . . . okay you can say it is too small, then leave it 
and resign. . . .  Commitment is cardinal.  And as I sit here, I think 
that people are just not committed.  Or maybe they are tired.  I 
don‘t know.‖167 
Discussing the school‘s most significant challenges, Mrs. 
Chanda also noted the law faculty‘s failure to produce scholarship.  
It is rare for faculty of the School of Law to publish at all, and even 
less common for them to publish outside the School‘s own journal, 
the Zambia Law Journal.168  This systemic failure to engage in 
research and to produce scholarship has also contributed to the 
School‘s failure to provide adequate pedagogy.169  Similarly, 
incentives to supplement law teaching with other endeavors have 
left law teachers in other African countries with little time for 
 
163 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
164 Id. 
165 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 497 (indicating that the pressure to increase 
law school class sizes without the necessary resources to do so ―ha[s] adversely 
affected the learning environment‖). 
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academic writing.170  In some countries, government hostility to 
faculty research efforts has inhibited scholarship.171  Chanda 
summarized the current state of research at UNZA somberly.  
―Research is very minimal.  It‘s the pillar of teaching, but very little 
is happening,‖ she said.172 
Finally, Mrs. Chanda expressed a belief that despite fairly 
consistent high admissions standards throughout the School‘s 
history, the quality and attitudes of matriculating students have 
declined over time, in part due to failures in the country‘s primary 
and secondary education systems.173  ―It‘s like we are not getting 
the cream anymore.  This problem is not starting from UNZA.  It‘s 
starting from the primary school.  But there is a problem in the 
education system.  Even simple sentence construction, nowadays, a 
fourth year university student, they write sentences that make you 
think, which school did you go to?‖ Chanda said.  And Dean 
Chanda believes the problem is partly an issue of attitude.  ―They 
want things given to them.  They are not willing to read, they are 
not willing to do their work,‖ she said of UNZA‘s law students.174 
 
170 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 98 (noting that African law teachers are 
overextended and must engage in outside employment to compensate for low 
teaching salaries). 
171 See id. at 100 (citing evidence that government authorities play a role in 
impeding the improvement and reform of African legal education). 
172 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
173 Mrs. Chanda noted that UNZA central administration‘s shift, several 
years ago, to a quota system by which it holds a fixed number of spaces at the 
School of Law open for students from Humanities, rather than using a strict cutoff 
based on first-year marks in Humanities, may have slightly reduced the quality of 
students, but students matriculating at the School of Law now have relatively 
similar marks in their first year at the University to students from previous 
decades.  Id. 
174 Id.  Despite Mrs. Chanda‘s statement that UNZA‘s admissions standards 
have remained essentially constant, the opinion is common amongst Zambian 
lawyers that standards at UNZA have declined.  ―Nowadays, students are all 
driving cars.  They are all accountants, HR managers.  They are in full 
employment.  Generally, the strict requirements for getting into law school have 
been compromised at UNZA.  Now, all those with money, you want to do law, 
you go law school.‖  Interview with Likando Kalaluka, supra note 113.  Mr. 
Ngulube expressed similar sentiments.  ―I think the standards have gone down,‖ 
he said.  ―And this is evident in the skill that you notice in the lawyers when they 
finally come to practice.  They are not as sharp as the lawyers that left in the early 
90s and mid-90s . . . some of the people that are doing law would have been better 
off doing something else.‖  Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3; 
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
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At least part of the Zambian legal academy‘s failure likely 
results from pedagogical choices.  Like most other former British 
colonies in Africa, UNZA‘s School of Law adopted the British 
approach to legal education as an undergraduate degree 
program.175  Students who want to matriculate into the School of 
Law spend their first year at UNZA in the School of Humanities 
and Social Sciences and then study at the School of Law for an 
additional three years.176  The structure of the law curriculum is 
inherited from the British system and is similar to that in most 
other common law countries.  Students in their second year of legal 
study take Legal Process, Law of Contract, Torts, Criminal Law, 
and Constitutional Law.177  The third year, like the second, is 
composed only of required courses including, Land Law, 
Commercial Law, Family Law, Evidence, and Administrative 
Law.178  In the final year of study, the school requires students to 
take Jurisprudence and Company Law, and students are then free 
to choose three electives.179  Students in their second year of legal 
study participate in a moot court program, and, as in most other 
African countries, students in their final year of study must write a 
research paper under the supervision of a member of the faculty.180  
At UNZA, as at most other law schools in common law Africa, 
faculties have inherited their teaching styles from the British 
tradition, but with greater stress on formalism.181  In most classes, 
students do not study cases or learn through the Socratic 
Method.182  Instead, most members of the faculty assign textbooks 
and teach through the lecture method, generally supplemented by 
separate tutorials in which students participate in the learning 
process through exercises and presentations.183  Nonetheless, the 
 
175 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
176 Id. 
177 UNIV. OF ZAMBIA SCHOOL OF LAW HANDBOOK 9 (2008) (on file with author). 
178 Id. at 10. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 11. 
181 See Stephen K. Huber, Legal Education in Anglo-Phonic Africa: With 
Particular Attention to a Case Book and the Criminal Law, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 1188, 1190 
(1969) (highlighting some of the challenges students face as a result of receiving a 
formalistic education in a rapidly changing society); Ndulo, supra note 10, at 492 
(detailing the focus of African legal education on the mere memorization, not 
application, of legal standards and rules). 
182 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145. 
183 Id. 
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pedagogical approach tends toward the rote and mechanistic.184  
Teachers generally do not focus on policy questions, and students 
are expected to memorize large numbers of rules, studying the 
holdings of major cases rather than the cases themselves or the 
reasoning used to arrive at legal conclusions.185  The pedagogical 
focus on rote memorization of rules likely inhibits students‘ 
development of the critical reasoning skills necessary to excel at 
ZIALE and to be fully effective as practitioners, for practitioners 
are unlikely to encounter the precise situations students learn in 
the classroom, and even if they do, they are unlikely to remember 
what they learned. 
The gap between theory-based curricula and the more practice-
oriented approach at ZIALE may also partially explain why law 
graduates are unprepared for the rigors of the bar admissions 
course.186  At UNZA, while a clinical program once gave some 
students the chance to gain practical experience and knowledge, 
the school closed its clinic in 2009 after it determined there was 
insufficient oversight to provide students with meaningful 
learning experiences.187  As discussed below, ZIALE‘s curriculum 
has also developed into a largely academic enterprise, with 
students attending lectures on subjects that often correspond with 
law school courses.  Even so, ZIALE does test students on a range 
of practice-oriented knowledge, and the lack of clinical programs 
at Zambia‘s law schools, along with the focus on academic 
knowledge at those schools, may contribute to low pass rates at 
ZIALE. 
At UNZA, there may be some reason for optimism.  In the last 
year, the School of Law has begun to encourage lecturers to 
experiment with the Socratic Method, and in some classes the 
school has abandoned the use of tutorials as law faculty shift 
toward a more interactive approach to teaching.188  Moreover, 
 
184 See Ndulo, supra note 10, at 492–93 (emphasizing the need for a shift in 
focus from rules-based thinking to critical thinking in the African legal education 
system). 
185 Id. at 493. 
186 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Palan 
Mulonda, supra note 31. 
187 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
188 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145.  School of Law Dean 
Margaret Munalula distributed notes in mid-2010 declaring ―the teaching 
methodology will from 2010 onwards change to the Socratic Method.‖  Dr. 
Margaret Munalula, Teaching in the School of Law: Relevant Materials and Notes, 4 
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despite the faculty‘s serious failure to produce scholarly literature, 
the school initiated a book project five years ago, providing 
financial incentives for faculty to write books with some focus on 
local law.189  Since the beginning of the book project, members of 
the faculty have produced casebooks on torts, contracts, and 
criminal law, amongst others.190  While these books often contain 
very little explanatory commentary, the focus on cases may 
improve the educational experience of students.  Moreover, the 
inclusion of Zambian cases will make legal education more 
relevant to Zambian students.  Finally, local production of the 
books, which UNZA Press publishes,191 may provide students with 
easier access to required materials. 
Nonetheless, a severe shortage of material resources at UNZA 
hampers the educational experience and compounds the problem 
of low salaries driving faculty toward outside jobs.  In the survey 
of full-time students in their second-to-last year, 82.4% of 
respondents listed a lack of books or other learning materials as 
one of the most serious problems at the law school, making this 
problem the most commonly cited issue amongst the surveyed 
students.192  In fact, it is incredibly difficult for most students at the 
School of Law to access books for the School‘s required courses.  
While new casebooks by local faculty may ease the dilemma, 
historically the campus bookstore has carried very few of the books 
required for law school classes, and it is expensive and logistically 
difficult for students to get law books from abroad.193  Moreover, 
the School‘s law library, a converted faculty office, is insufficiently 
stocked and open to students only a few hours a week at most.194  
As a result, large groups of students often share a single book, and 
others go without.195  
Until a few years ago, the University of Zambia, the country‘s 
flagship public university, had the only law school in Zambia.  
 
(June 15, 2010) (on file with author).  The distributed notes also included a 
Wikipedia article on the Socratic Method.  Id. at 40. 
189 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School of 
Law, supra note 150. 
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Since 2005, however, three new law schools have emerged in 
Lusaka.196  Because none of Zambia‘s new law schools have had 
any students gain admission to the bar yet, it is too early to assess 
how effectively they are preparing students for practice.  So far, in 
any case, members of the legal community have tended to view 
these new law schools as offering less rigorous, inferior programs 
compared to UNZA.197 
Some of the problems at Zambia‘s newer law schools 
undoubtedly mirror those at the UNZA.  For one thing, lecturers at 
the fledgling institutions are often moonlighting faculty from 
UNZA,198 already stretched too thin to devote full attention to their 
teaching duties at the nation‘s first law school.  Second, one of 
these new schools, Zambia Open University, is a correspondence 
program,199 which certainly compounds the challenges for students 
hoping to get one-on-one attention from their teachers.  
Pedagogical approaches at the other two law schools, Lusaka 
University and Cavendish University, are similar to those at 
UNZA.200  Moreover, while UNZA‘s law clinic has shut down at 
least for the time being, none of the new law schools have offered 
any clinical education programs at all.201  Finally, there seems to be 
a consensus that Zambia‘s new law schools have lower admissions 
requirements and, generally, lower caliber students than UNZA.202  
Ultimately, the performance of the law graduates of Zambia‘s 
newer law schools at ZIALE may provide some insight on the 
quality of legal education at those institutions. 
Despite the apparently widespread sentiment in Zambia‘s legal 
community that the new law schools are inferior to UNZA, they 
may, in time provide an important spur to pedagogical innovation 
as they compete for students.  Likewise, they may exert pressure 
on each other‘s faculties to demonstrate greater devotion to their 
 
196 These schools, which are all private, are Zambia Open University, Lusaka 
University, and Cavendish University.  Id. 
197 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Likando 
Kalaluka, supra note 113; Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3; 
Interview with Alice Sitali, supra note 120. 
198 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
202 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; Interview with Likando 
Kalaluka, supra note 113; Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3; 
Interview with Alice Sitali, supra note 120. 
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academic responsibilities.  While UNZA‘s public status might, to 
some extent, insulate the School of Law from the effects of this 
competition, it is unlikely to be completely immune to it.  
Ultimately, despite the skepticism Zambian lawyers have shown 
toward the newer schools, these institutions have the potential to 
improve the Zambian legal community both by providing a larger 
pool of new lawyers to the country and, through competitive 
pressure, by raising the quality of Zambian legal education. 
4.1.2.  Reasons for Resource Scarcity: A Case of Malign Neglect 
Overall, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that economic 
factors are at the heart of the Zambian legal academy‘s 
dysfunction.  Of course, even under the best of circumstances, 
Zambia‘s relative national poverty would limit the resources 
available for both public and private education.  Nonetheless, 
external factors have likely added to the problem.  First, while 
African law schools benefitted greatly from early support by 
Western donors, that support declined severely beginning a 
generation ago.203  In the 1960s and 1970s, as African states gained 
independence, Western nations contributed human and financial 
resources to help build the continent‘s new law schools.204  This 
influx of assistance derived largely from a prevalent philosophical 
conviction that educating new lawyers was crucial to the social and 
political development of Africa‘s new nations.205  Yet a 
combination of factors led to an almost complete abandonment of 
these early projects.  As many African states descended into 
political turmoil and one-party systems ruled by autocratic leaders, 
national support for education in general and legal education in 
 
203 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 79 (recounting the decline in American 
legal assistance, and an overall decrease in Western assistance to the developing 
world, which were both detrimental to the continuing developmental progress of 
African law schools); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 493 
(explaining that many British and American legal scholars have stopped teaching 
in African countries due to the lack of economic stability, as well as the decline in 
Western funding to support such teachers). 
204 See Geraghty & Quansah, supra note 154, at 89-91 (describing the initial 
commitment American law teachers had provided to legal educators in Africa as 
part of the ―law and development‖ movement). 
205 Id. (noting that the once prevailing notion that improved legal education 
in Africa would further economic efficiency, equality, and justice, has disappeared 
because of the declining support from external donors). 
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particular declined.206  At the same time, a debate emerged 
amongst Western legal academics as to whether the ―law and 
development‖ philosophy that drove early support for building 
African law schools modeled on Western academies was truly the 
best way to meet the needs of African countries.207  Ultimately, 
external support for African legal education dwindled to almost 
nothing.208 
This decline coincided with the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) imposing austerity measures that required 
pronounced cuts in public spending as conditions of continued 
loan agreements for governments in developing countries.209  Thus, 
while educational spending retained its relative position as a 
percentage of social spending, the overall decline in such 
expenditures throughout Africa meant less money and fewer 
resources for African law schools.210  In Zambia in particular, the 
transition from Kenneth Kaunda‘s one-party state to the 
restoration of multi-party democracy in 1991 also marked a rapid 
shift toward economic liberalization and away from the highly 
regulated, state-directed economy of Kaunda‘s regime.211  While 
 
206 Id. (stating that since 1986, there has been no organized effort among 
American legal educators to provide the same assistance they had provided in 
previous decades). 
207 Id. (claiming that ―the time is now ripe for such a reassessment and for the 
development of new strategies‖ regarding legal education in Africa). 
208 Id. 
209 Id.; see Thomas A. Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World: 
The Troubling Case of Niger, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 321, 327–28 (2007) (explaining 
that the Washington Legal Consensus called for decreased social spending and 
reallocation of resources to the private sector); Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, 
supra note 10, at 496–97 (describing how in many African countries, funding for 
education is being jeopardized by the failure of the government to maintain 
budget allocations in the face of economic decline). 
210 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 496–97 (noting that 
this lack in funding is exacerbated because most law schools are state-funded 
institutions). 
211 See REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Executive Summary, ZAMBIA: 
DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE 
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2000), available at http://raid-
uk.org/work/zambia.htm (summarizing the effects of economic deregulation on 
fundamental economic and social rights in Zambia); REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., 
OXFORD UNIV., Education, ZAMBIA: DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
(2000), available at http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia 
/Privatisation_Rpt/S3_ii.pdf (stating that the MMD inherited an educational 
system that was already in decline because of lack of investment during the 1985-
90 economic downturn). 
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Kaunda had nationalized a higher percentage of the country‘s 
industry than almost any other country on the continent, the new 
government adopted World Bank and IMF policies geared toward 
deregulation, privatization, and rationalization of the public sector 
employment system.212  At the same time, World Bank and IMF 
austerity measures have resulted in a ―massive absolute reduction 
in public spending‖ in Zambia.213  As a consequence, educational 
spending declined sharply, both as a percentage of GDP and in real 
terms.214  By 1996, average real spending in Zambia was only $50 
per student, while it had been $118 in 1983.215 
The decline in resources available for public education in 
Zambia may account for a reduction in the quality of primary and 
secondary education in the country and for the prevalent sense 
that students matriculating into Zambian universities have lower 
educational aptitude than their counterparts in the 1990s.  In any 
case, the dearth of resources is clearly evident at the UNZA School 
of Law and certainly accounts, to a large extent, for the severe 
human resources problems and for the insufficient availability of 
educational material.  Ultimately, these limitations have kept 
academic salaries low, ensuring that members of Zambian law 
faculties will have powerful incentives to seek outside work.  A 
corresponding scarcity of material resources, including 
inadequately stocked law libraries, has prevented students from 
gaining access to required reading materials for their classes.  It 
seems likely, moreover, that declining expenditures on primary 
education have led to a decline in the quality of students entering 
Zambian law schools, thus making the task of educating new 
lawyers more difficult.  Yet the conclusion is inescapable that the 
 
212 Id. 
213 See REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Austerity and the Denial of Social 
Rights, ZAMBIA: DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO 
THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 220 (2000), available at 
http://raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia/Privatisation_Rpt/Sde_i.pdf (―However, in the 
case of Zambia it is the catastrophic decline in overall levels of funding of the 
social sectors in real terms which is the cause of most concern.‖).  This problem 
has been exacerbated by the austerity measures demanded by the Bank and IMF. 
214 See REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., OXFORD UNIV., Education, ZAMBIA: 
DEREGULATION AND THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE 
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2000), available at http://www.raid-
uk.org/docs/Zambia/Privatisation_Rpt/S3_ii.pdf (noting that the lack of 
resources available is the major contributor to failures in the African legal 
education system). 
215 Id. at Section 3.I.C.1, EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION.  
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University of Zambia (and probably Zambia‘s newer law schools) 
bears some of the responsibility for failing to adequately prepare 
Zambian law students for entrance into the post-graduate bar-
admissions program; and, in the final analysis, failure rates at 
ZIALE are a crucial cause of the limited number of lawyers in 
Zambia. 
4.2. Bar Admission: The Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal 
Education 
Earning a law degree is not the final challenge in the gauntlet 
of obstacles an aspiring Zambian lawyer must face.  As is typical in 
common law countries in Africa, admission to the bar in Zambia 
requires completion of a formal, post-graduate academic 
curriculum after attaining an LLB;216 as mentioned above, ZIALE 
currently authorizes and administers this curriculum in Zambia.  
While ZIALE may help prepare would-be lawyers for the rigors of 
practice, the Institute operates as a barrier to entry to the legal 
profession that prevents many Zambian law graduates from 
becoming lawyers.  And though Zambia‘s resource-strapped 
education system bears some of the responsibility for failure rates 
at ZIALE, institutional problems at ZIALE itself likely contribute to 
the crisis. 
In general, the African post-graduate bar-admissions program, 
often called a law practice institute, takes between a year and a 
year-and-a-half to complete.217  Though originally intended as 
practice labs, mimicking the atmosphere of law offices and with 
few formal lectures, many of these institutes have developed into 
something more akin to an extra year of law school, in which 
institute faculty teach traditional law school subjects in a classroom 
setting.218  In Zambia, after students finish their law degrees, they 
spend ten months studying ten subjects at ZIALE.219  While some 
of these subjects are practice-oriented, ZIALE staff teaches all of the 
subjects in an academic, classroom setting through a traditional 
 
216 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 49–94 (stating the 
general educational requirements for practicing law in African countries). 
217 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
218 See Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 494 (describing the 
lack of practical experience in post-graduate institutes, due in large part to the 
shortage of practitioners on staff). 
219 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
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lecture method.220  To gain clinical experience, ZIALE students 
spend the first half of each day working in a law office or 
governmental department, and they spend afternoons attending 
lectures at ZIALE headquarters.221  
ZIALE candidates take mid-term tests and final exams in each 
subject, and in order to qualify as lawyers they must pass all ten 
courses.222  If a ZIALE candidate passes all ten subjects, she is then 
called to the bar and can begin practicing law immediately.223  If 
she fails six or fewer exams, she may retake exams for only the 
subjects she failed, and she may attempt to retake those exams a 
maximum of two more times, after which the candidate must wait 
five years before repeating the entire ten-subject course.224  If the 
candidate fails seven or more exams, she must retake exams for all 
ten courses, subject also to the five-year ban if she fails to pass all 
ten subjects after a maximum of three total attempts.225 
Tuition at ZIALE is 12 million Kwacha (about $2,500 USD in 
the winter of 2011), which is more than twice the price of full 
tuition for the final year of law school at UNZA.226 While 
approximately 75 percent of UNZA students are on some level of 
government scholarship,227 ZIALE does not provide scholarships to 
any students.228  Despite the high price tag, some law firms sponsor 
ZIALE students, and those without sponsorship from employers 
sometimes find support from immediate or extended family 
members.229  According to Palan Mulonda, ZIALE‘s director, there 
are very few Zambian law graduates unable to attend ZIALE due 
to financial constraints.230  Nonetheless, Mr. Mulonda noted that 
until a recent shift in policy requiring ZIALE candidates to pay 75 
 
220 ZIALE courses include professional conduct; bookkeeping/accounts; 
conveyancing/legal drafting; probate; commercial transactions; company law; 
civil procedure; domestic relations; criminal procedure; and evidence.  Interview 






226 University of Zambia, Academic Office figures show the tuition for 4th 
year LLB students to be 2,983,500 kwacha per semester. 
227 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
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percent of tuition up front, many candidates attended ZIALE on 
credit, and outstanding debts to the institution go back a decade.231  
The cost seems even more significant given the high failure rates at 
the Institute. 
Only a small fraction of law graduates who enroll at ZIALE 
will pass the course on their first attempt, and for the past several 
years, first-time takers have cleared ZIALE at rates hovering 
between ten percent and twelve percent.232  Somewhat more 
encouraging figures emerge on examination of longer-term 
statistics.  For example, 61.5% (360 out of 585) of the people who 
enrolled at ZIALE between 2003 and 2009 gained admission to 
practice by the fall of 2010.233  Even so, these figures indicate that a 
large percentage of Zambian law graduates are unable to practice 
law and unable to contribute to the country‘s legal needs. 
ZIALE‘s low pass rates are attributable, in part, to the dramatic 
resource limitations of the Zambian education system, from 
primary through tertiary school.  Nonetheless, ZIALE itself bears 
some portion of the responsibility for high failure rates at the 
Institute.  First, although ZIALE‘s curriculum mimics that of a 
typical law school, with teachers lecturing on academic subjects in 
a classroom setting, lecturers at ZIALE tend to be practitioners 
with little or no outside experience as educators.234  Second, 
although ZIALE students spend weekday mornings in clinical 
attachments, the organizations that host them often do not expose 
students to the range of clinical experiences necessary to 
supplement the academic portion of the program and to prepare 
students for ZIALE exams.235  Finally, a lack of grading 
transparency raises concerns about the integrity of the process. 
Despite the original intention to organize Zambia‘s law practice 
institute as a clinical laboratory, offering students the chance to 
learn in a practice-oriented setting, the program at ZIALE currently 
resembles a conventional law school curriculum far more than a 
practitioner‘s office.236  This setup may be an imperfect mechanism 
for preparing future lawyers for the profession.  Perhaps more 




233 Figures provided by ZIALE headquarters on November 9, 2010. 
234 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
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its schizophrenic mismatch of a faculty comprised almost entirely 
of practitioners with a curriculum focused on academic pedagogy.  
To be sure, ZIALE‘s faculty contains many of Zambia‘s most 
illustrious lawyers, including a former attorney general, supreme 
court judges, and some of the country‘s most respected and 
experienced private practitioners.237  Nonetheless, given the 
academic nature of ZIALE classes, these lawyers may not be 
ideally suited to their roles at the Institute. 
In Zambia, as in most common law countries, the legal 
practitioner‘s degree is an undergraduate LLB, and aspiring legal 
academics must obtain an LLM before they can teach.238  By 
retaining a faculty composed almost entirely of practitioners, 
however, ZIALE has accepted a cadre of law teachers without the 
academic training generally required for such an enterprise.  If 
ZIALE were truly run as a clinical program, practitioners would 
likely be the best people to administer it.  Under the circumstances, 
however, ZIALE‘s faculty is likely unprepared for its 
responsibilities. 
This problem may be compounded by the club-like nature of 
ZIALE hiring.  According to ZIALE Director Palan Mulonda, 
ZIALE has traditionally been a ―closed-shop‖ when it comes to 
choosing new instructors.239  The Institute has not advertised for 
open positions, but, rather, current members of the faculty have 
―head hunted,‖ recommending new teachers to their peers.240  
Overall, the composition of the faculty has been fairly stagnant, 
and many of the members of ZIALE‘s faculty have been teaching at 
ZIALE and its predecessor, the Law Practice Institute, since the 
1960s.241  As a consequence, teaching at ZIALE suffers.  According 
to current ZIALE students, several of the instructors simply read 
lectures from prepared notes, and others forgo doctrinal teaching 
for large portions of the class period to engage students in casual 
discussions about current events.242  Ultimately, it may behoove 
ZIALE to reconsider its curriculum, its hiring process, or both. 
 
237 Id. 
238 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
239 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Interviews with four anonymous ZIALE students, in Lusaka, Zambia 
(Nov. 28, 2010). 
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A second problem at ZIALE is that, although students enrolled 
in the program spend several hours a day in clinical pupilages, 
attached to local firms or government departments, these 
attachments often do not provide ZIALE candidates with sufficient 
clinical experience to prepare them for their qualifying exams.243  
ZIALE‘s pupilages are intended to supplement the academic 
portion of the curriculum, and should be a crucial component of 
each student‘s preparation for the bar.  In theory, these pupilages 
should expose students to a wide variety of practice areas, and, at 
least historically, this would have been eminently feasible, with 
Lusaka‘s small law firms engaged in general practice and handling 
a broad array of cases. 
Nonetheless, students attached to a government office were 
always likely to work in only a limited area of practice.  Moreover, 
many Lusaka firms now specialize in only one or two fields.244  
Today, it is common for these firms to use ZIALE students as work 
horses on menial projects, providing little oversight or guidance to 
help students develop as lawyers.245  As in Zambia, students at the 
law practice institutes of other African countries undertake 
apprenticeships in law firms, and they encounter a host of 
problems similar to those faced by students in Zambia; the typical 
African law firm is ―small and poorly organized,‖ and senior 
lawyers generally have little time to assist with the training of 
apprentices.246  This is certainly the case in Zambia, and, in the final 
analysis, ZIALE students tend to receive insufficient guidance 
during their apprenticeships and to work in only a small portion of 
the fields covered in the ZIALE course.  In the opinion of Mr. 
Mulonda, ZIALE‘s director, this has ―far reaching consequences on 
their performance‖ at ZIALE.247 
Finally, a lack of transparency in ZIALE‘s grading process has 
the potential to undermine the integrity of the system.  Despite 
ZIALE‘s failure rates, students who do not clear midterms or final 
exams are not permitted to review their test papers.248  In the 
opinion of Mr. Mulonda, such transparency is unnecessary and 
 
243 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa, supra note 10, at 494 (detailing the failure 
of many law practice institutes to meet the expectations of their founders). 
247 Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
248 Id. 
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would be counterproductive.249  First, Mr. Mulonda pointed out 
that ZIALE assigns both a lecturer and an assessor for each subject, 
and assessors go over the lecturers‘ grades to ensure reliability.250  
Additionally, according to Mr. Mulonda, allowing students to 
review exam papers would be an annoyance to ZIALE lecturers 
that would deter high-quality instructors from teaching at the 
Institute.251 
Nonetheless, allowing students to review exam papers would 
serve two important purposes.  First, given that around 90 percent 
of ZIALE candidates fail the course on their first attempt, 
permitting exam review would be a highly useful learning 
experience that could help unsuccessful candidates understand the 
reasons for their failures and how to improve their performances.  
Second, greater transparency would ensure the integrity of the 
grading process, including both the good faith of the graders and 
the accuracy of the results. 
Ultimately, the lawyers who administer and teach at ZIALE 
have financial incentives to keep the profession small.  With only a 
few hundred private practitioners in the country, many Zambian 
law firms are able to charge hundreds of dollars an hour, fees that 
equal or surpass those of lawyers in countries like the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and that are vastly 
disproportionate to incomes of other professionals in Zambia.  
Simple rules of supply and demand ensure that smaller numbers 
of lawyers will tend to keep fees higher, and an influx of new 
talent into the profession would increase competition and lower 
the price of legal services.  This economic reality may have a 
subconscious influence even on lecturers and assessors grading in 
good faith.  To some extent, that monopolistic impulse may have 
influenced ZIALE‘s initial refusal to allow students from Zambia‘s 
new law schools to matriculate at the Institute, a decision that 
stood until students from those schools compelled ZIALE to accept 




251 ―The exam scripts are the property of ZIALE.  You would just be opening 
an unnecessary Pandora‘s box.  We believe we have serious quality assurance 
with people of high integrity.  We don‘t need to subject these people to 
unnecessary scrutiny from litigious and vexatious students.  It would be hard to 
retain the high quality lecturers we have if we opened them up to that.‖  Id. 
252 See Zambia Open University Law Students Win Major Legal Battle, supra note 
142.  Students at fledging law schools in Kenya and Ghana have won similar 
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would provide an important check on the natural incentive of the 
legal community in the final analysis, a professional guild to 
keep competition to a minimum by restricting access to the 
profession.  
Likewise, allowing students to view their exams would create 
an extra check on possible grading errors by ZIALE lecturers and 
assessors.  While it is likely that these professionals grade in good 
faith, like the members of UNZA‘s faculty, they are extraordinarily 
busy, stretched thin by multiple professional endeavors and 
competing demands on their time.  Students, who ultimately have 
the strongest incentive to ensure the accuracy of their results, could 
play a vital role in guaranteeing the dependability of the grading 
process.  If ZIALE‘s grading system is truly reliable, the Institute‘s 
lecturers and assessors should have little concern about opening 
that system to review. 
A variety of causes have prevented the Zambian legal 
profession from growing quickly enough to meet the country‘s 
legal needs.  The legacy of colonialism, including the suppression 
of African education, is a primary factor.  After independence, the 
abrupt transition to a Western legal framework and the need for 
sophisticated legal experts to navigate the complex, foreign 
machinery of the new system left the country in an immediate and 
continuing crisis.  Since independence, the dearth of resources in 
Zambia‘s education system, along with institutional policy at 
UNZA and ZIALE, has suppressed the growth of the profession.  I 
will discuss possible ways to mitigate this crisis in Section 7 below. 
5. ALTERNATIVES TO FORMAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION: THE ROLE 
OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
Although the formal justice system processes private common 
law claims and criminal prosecutions under the Zambian penal 
code, customary law plays a more prominent role than any 
Western legal tradition for a large portion of Zambia‘s population.  
As discussed briefly above, Zambia‘s formal justice system remains 
pluralistic, with statutorily authorized local courts administering 
customary law, subject to review by courts using Western legal 
principles.  On appeal from a local court, Zambia‘s higher courts, 
 
battles in recent years to gain admission to their countries‘ law practice institutes.  
Interview with Palan Mulonda, supra note 30. 
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employing a standard adopted from British colonialists,253 will 
overturn customary law only if it is ―repugnant to natural justice, 
equity, or good conscience.‖254  Countries throughout Africa have 
implemented similar norms for navigating pluralistic systems, 
combining Western and indigenous legal principles.255  As is 
common throughout the continent, people living in rural areas 
tend to live almost entirely under the umbrella of customary law, 
administered by traditional courts that operate without the 
sanction of the formal justice system.256 
Zambia‘s diverse range of customary law traditions is largely 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Nonetheless, it is worth engaging 
in a brief discussion of customary law in Zambia because the 
application of that law provides an alternative to Western legal 
processes in which lawyers are indispensible to the accurate 
administration of justice and may mitigate, to some extent, the 
problems associated with the critical shortage of Zambian lawyers.  
The use of customary law often leads to violations of ostensibly 
universal human rights deeply ingrained in the collective 
consciousness of the Western world and enshrined in international 
covenants and national laws.257  On the other hand, customary law 
 
253 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 958 (citing J.L. Kanganja, Courts and 
Judges in Zambia: The Evolution of the Modern Judicial System (1981) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London) (on file with the University of 
London Library); Merry, supra note 21 at 897 (noting that colonial governments 
created a dual legal system by permitting Africans to retain ―indigenous‖ or 
―native law‖ subject to Western legal review by their colonial rulers). 
254 See Local Courts Act of 1966, Cap. 29, 4 Laws of Rep. of Zambia (1995) 
(stating how customary law interacts with a formal system of justice); Richardson, 
supra note 14, at 21. 
255 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14 (discussing the Nigerian legal system as 
an example ). 
256 See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21 (noting that, in addition to the official 
local courts recognized by the Zambian government under the Local Courts Act, 
there also exist traditional courts which are not officially recognized by the 
Zambian government, and which have no link to the local courts or other official 
Zambian courts). 
257 See generally Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in 
Postcolonial Africa: Options and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 635, 635–36 (2000) (discussing broad issues concerning gender, 
human rights, and legal pluralism in Africa); Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing 
the Swazi custom of ―sexual cleansing,‖ whereby a widow marries her husband‘s 
brother and the deceased‘s property passes to the brother); Mwenda et al., supra 
note 14 (discussing the problem of ―property-grabbing‖ under customary law, 
where family members of deceased husbands can take property from widows); 
Richardson, supra note 14 (identifying the lack of inheritance rights as a key cause 
of many women‘s rights issues in Africa). 
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courts can also serve as effective mechanisms for enforcing social 
order and community norms and can provide useful alternatives to 
Western legal frameworks in countries in which the formal legal 
infrastructure is relatively undeveloped.  In this sense, customary 
law both helps to fill gaps in the primarily Western-oriented, state-
sponsored legal system and to underscore the need for further 
development of that system to combat abusive and inequitable 
practices. 
Zambia‘s local courts, where lawyers are prohibited from 
representing clients, are empowered to adjudicate a wide variety of 
claims according to customary traditions, including simple tort and 
contract actions.258  The majority of claims adjudicated in local 
courts, however, involve domestic relationships, including spousal 
abuse, divorce claims, and matters of succession.259  Traditional 
courts, operating in rural areas, oversee all claims arising from 
disputes in their territories,260 including, commonly, witchcraft 
trials.  Although the use of customary law can provide a vital 
means of preserving the cultural heritage of African communities 
and of supplementing resource-strapped Western legal systems, 
implementation of customary law can also result in shocking 
injustice.  Sexual purification of widows and property grabbing, 
two customs common throughout much of Zambia and much of 
Southern Africa, merit particular attention, both because of their 
widespread use and because of the enormity of their impact on 
African populations. 
The rite of sexual purification of widows in Zambia typically 
involves sexual intercourse between a male relative of the deceased 
husband and the new widow.261  Tradition holds that this practice 
cleanses the widow of her late husband‘s spirit, and communities 
throughout Southern and East Africa exert great pressure on 
widows to submit to the rite soon after their husbands‘ burials.262  
 
258 Local Courts Act of 1966, Cap. 29, 4 Laws of Rep. of Zambia (1995) pt. 3, §§ 
8–9. 
259 The Dilemma of Local Courts in Zambia: A Question of Colonial Legal 
Continuity or Deliberate Customary Law Marginalisation, AFRONET, available at 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/library/Online/USP%20Only/Customary 
%20Law/Dilemna.htm. 
260 See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing the Zambian dual legal 
system). 
261 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing developments in African customs 
and laws regarding the sexual cleansing of widows). 
262 Id. (noting similar practices in Malawi and Kenya). 
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Despite the onslaught of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, adherence to 
the custom of sexual cleansing remains prevalent because of the 
deeply held belief that it is necessary to prevent insanity and 
disease from spreading through a widow‘s village.263  Widows who 
resist the practice may be ostracized and prevented from 
remarrying, and communities are likely to blame non-compliant 
widows for subsequent misfortune that befalls the village.264  In 
some areas, use of a condom during the rite of sexual cleansing is 
prohibited as incompatible with the tradition.265 
Local and traditional courts in Zambia have been active 
enforcers of sexual purification rites.266  Traditional courts are 
beyond the reach of the formal justice system.  Local courts are 
subject to oversight from magistrates‘ courts, the High Court, and 
the Supreme Court, but despite a 1967 decision in which the High 
Court found sexual cleansing repugnant to natural justice and 
invalid,267 the same court upheld the practice in 1987, preventing a 
widow from remarrying until a member of her late husband‘s 
family had intercourse with her.268  Consequently, the practice is 
still widespread, and, for obvious reasons, it raises troubling 
concerns, both as a matter of public health in a country suffering 
terribly from the African AIDS pandemic and in terms of women‘s 
sexual autonomy. 
Similarly, property grabbing implicates the rights of widows.  
The practice, rooted in the traditional treatment of private property 
as belonging to an entire extended family rather than to any 
particular individual,269 generally entails relatives of a deceased 
 
263 Id. (―[C]hange is coming slowly, village by village, hut by hut.  In a region 
where belief in witchcraft is widespread and many women are taught from 
childhood not to challenge tribal leaders or the prerogatives of men, the fear of 
flouting tradition often outweighs even the fear of AIDS.‖). 
264 Id. (retelling the story of Fanny, a twenty-three year old Malawian widow 
whose deceased husband‘s relatives threatened that if she refused to exorcise her 
dead husband's spirit, she would be blamed every time a villager died). 
265 Id. 
266 See Himonga, supra note 62, at 32–33 (noting that ―traditional‖ local courts 
enforce purification rights by awarding damages to actors who claim to have been 
aggrieved by people who are alleged to have cibinde, the condition of being 
tainted by the spirit of the dead spouse). 
267 Kaniki v. Jairus, (1967) ZLR 71 [HC]. 
268 See Himonga, supra note 62, at 32 (citing Kadakwa v. Siadimbozye 
1987/HP/A/10 (Lusaka)). 
269 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (noting that under the custom in Swaziland, 
women may not own property or enter into contracts without the sponsorship of 
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husband taking away items from the marital household, thus 
depriving many widows of their only earthly possessions.270  In 
Zambia, the practice is tied to the powerful belief in communal 
ownership of property, especially in rural areas.271  While it is 
plausible that this communitarian approach to property rights 
confers real benefits on traditional African communities, it is 
undeniable that property grabbing has dispossessed countless 
Zambian widows and their children of their primary means of 
economic and, in some cases, biological survival.272 
Despite Zambia‘s accession to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and 
domestic legislation that provides some protection from property 
grabbing, the tradition is deeply entrenched.273  In fact, the custom 
is so common that frequent involvement by law enforcement 
officers complicates attempts to enforce the law.274  Furthermore, 
 
a male relative, and that Swazi custom holds that a deceased husband‘s property 
belongs to his family and not to his widow); Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 954–
55. 
270 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 950, 954–55 (noting that African 
customary law is cited as justification for disenfranchising a widow from owning 
even property jointly purchased with the deceased husband and observing that 
―[i]f an individual with custody of commonly owned property dies, his relatives 
will take custody of the property, leaving the deceased‘s widow without any legal 
or equitable entitlement to it, unless the deceased‘s extended family assigns her 
such rights‖); Richardson, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing similar practices in 
Zambia, Botswana, and Ghana). 
271 Mwenda, Mumba & Mvula-Mwenda, supra note 14, at 954 (―A Zambian 
citizen has no legal capacity to dispose of property that is communally owned 
under a will. Such property is instead held in trust for his extended family—that 
is, the communal owners.‖). 
272 Id. at 951 (―When Tamara Zulu's husband died, leaving her as the sole 
breadwinner, she turned to her skills as a tailor to support her five children.  Then 
came Ms. Zulu's in-laws.  A month after the funeral, relying on tribal traditions 
that assign inheritance rights to relatives of deceased men, the out-of-towners 
swooped in and took everything, including Zulu's only sewing machine.  The 
suddenly destitute widow scrambled to rent tailoring equipment and feed her 
family.‖) (quoting Geraldine Sealey, African Widows Left Destitute By Relatives 
Snatching Property, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 13, 2003, at 7). 
273 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  See Richardson, supra note 14, at 21 
(noting that although Zambia has ratified CEDAW and other international human 
rights treaties, the Zambian Constitution and laws continue to legitimize a 
discriminatory practices). 
274 See Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 952 (noting that police officers, who 
are poorly paid, poorly housed, and suffer poor working conditions, often benefit 
from the practice of property-grabbing and thus turn a blind eye). 
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although Zambia‘s constitution forbids gender discrimination, the 
same article makes an exception for customary law.275  Most 
Zambian women still marry under customary law, and when they 
seek redress for property grabbing or protection from the sexual 
purification rite in customary courts, they rarely prevail.276 
The prevalent use of customary law certainly helps to fill gaps 
in the undeveloped infrastructure of Zambia‘s western legal 
system.  Additionally, customary law may serve as a vital 
preservative of traditional cultural rites, threatened by ever-
encroaching Western sensibilities.  Both property grabbing and 
sexual purification of widows have been, historically, closely 
related to the tradition of levirate marriage, in which the deceased 
husband‘s brother marries the new widow, whom he ―inherits‖ 
along with his brother‘s property.277  Ideally, this practice can 
provide a valuable source of protection and security for widows 
and their children, ensuring their welfare and their continued 
participation in the life of the husband‘s family.278  However, 
extreme poverty, has led to the more common scenario of a 
widow‘s extended family looting the marital household without 
any concomitant fulfillment of traditional obligations to the widow 
or her children.279  Additionally, the AIDS pandemic has made the 
sexual purification rite devastatingly dangerous.  
Like Zambia, other African countries have grappled to find a 
balance between traditional norms that preserve cultural heritage 
and social harmony and Western legal principles that often conflict 
with those norms.280  Like Zambia, when traditional practices in 
 
275 CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 23(1) & 
(4)(d) (―Subject to clauses (4), (5) and (7), no law shall make any provision that is 
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect . . . Clause (1) shall not apply to any 
law so far as that law makes provision . . . for the application in the case of 
members of a particular race or tribe, of customary law with respect to any matter 
to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the 
case of other persons.‖). 
276 Mwenda et al., supra note 14, at 952 (citing Geraldine Sealey, African 
Widows Left Destitute By Relatives Snatching Property, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 
13, 2003, at 7, 10). 
277 See Mwenda, supra note 14 (noting that, under the levirate system, the 
children conceived after the husband‘s death are considered to be his offspring, 
and that, historically, ―the practice of widow inheritance guaranteed many 
widows and their children some form of social security‖). 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 See, e.g., Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 511–513, 558–569 (2010) (criticizing the ability of CEDAW 
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other African countries are incompatible with Western principles, 
the customs commonly implicate fundamental human rights 
concerns for vulnerable minorities.  Ultimately, the challenge for 
each of these countries is to find a way to safeguard its cultural 
legacy and maintain social order, while maintaining respect for 
rights considered crucial in the global community. 
As Professor Thomas Kelley has argued, wholesale suppression 
of traditional practices in a developing country with limited 
financial and legal resources could have a devastating impact.281  
Aside from any cultural implications, it is true that eliminating 
customary legal traditions without a sufficient means of filling the 
void left by their absence could result in chaos.282  Nonetheless, 
when custom is used as a pretext for oppression of the most 
vulnerable members of a society, it is clear that such custom is in 
need of reform.  Thus, while the use of customary law in Zambia 
 
and the African Charter to reconcile international human rights law and 
traditional norms, and analyzing the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights 
of Women in Africa for its potential to engage traditional leaders in dialogue 
about localized implementation of human rights norms); Jamil D. Mujuzi, Bride 
Wealth (Price) and Women’s Marriage—Related Rights in Uganda: A Historical 
Constitutional Perspective and Current Developments, 24 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 414, 
424–27 (2010) (arguing that, had the Ugandan Constitutional Court considered 
Uganda‘s international legal obligations under CEDAW, it would not have 
upheld as constitutional the retention of the cultural practice of bride price); 
Remigius N. Nwabueze, Securing Widows’ Sepulchral Rights through the Nigerian 
Constitution, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141, 147–155 (2010) (comparing, inter alia, the 
sepulchral rights of widows in the United States and Kenya, and proposing that 
the Nigerian Constitution could serve as the basis for expanding the sepulchral 
rights of Nigerian widows); Willem van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples 
on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal 
Systems, 104 AM. J. INT‘L L. 29, 57–62 (2010) (discussing the South African 
Constitutional Court‘s jurisprudence on indigenous law against the backdrop of 
the drafting and domestic reception of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People in several African countries). 
281 See generally Kelley, supra note 209 (offering a focused case study on how 
external legal reform has affected the day-to-day lives of people in Niger). 
282 In fact, in Zambia, there have been some promising signs of positive 
evolution of the sexual purification rite.  President Levy Mwanawasa, who served 
from 2001 until his death in 2008, urged that coercive sex between widows and 
their late husbands‘ relatives should be discouraged.  Sharon LaFraniere, AIDS 
Now Compels Africa to Reconsider Widows’ ‘Cleansing’, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at 
A8.  Since then, some of Zambia‘s tribal chiefs have declared they would not 
enforce the practice, and some of Zambia‘s tribes have successfully substituted 
cleansing rites that do not involve intercourse.  Nonetheless, the practice remains 
common in much of the country.  Id.; Mwenda, supra note 14 (discussing the 
decision among several chiefs to ban sexual cleansing out of a concern for the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS). 
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undoubtedly helps to conserve valuable cultural traditions and to 
maintain social order in areas where Zambia‘s Western legal 
structure remains undeveloped, some of the inequities of Zambian 
customary traditions also underscore the need to develop the 
formal legal infrastructure further.  An integral component of that 
development must be the growth of the legal profession, with a 
focus on the introduction of more lawyers into the system.  
Ultimately, lawyers have the unique technical expertise to oversee 
an expansion of the formal legal regime in a manner that can 
maintain Zambian cultural traditions while protecting the 
fundamental human rights of those most susceptible to abuse.  
Nonetheless, under the best of circumstances, this process will be 
slow.  In the next section, I will focus on Zambian paralegals in a 
discussion of mechanisms within the official justice system that can 
help mitigate the effects of Zambia‘s shortage of lawyers. 
6. ALTERNATIVES TO FORMAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION: 
PARALEGALS 
Customary law can serve as a valuable, albeit imperfect, means 
of filling gaps in Zambia‘s resource-strapped legal infrastructure, 
ameliorating the effects of the country‘s dearth of lawyers.  At least 
as administered in traditional courts, however, customary law is 
external to Zambia‘s official justice system and does nothing to 
improve the plight of those already enmeshed in conflict within 
that system, either as parties to civil litigation or as criminal 
defendants.  Because Zambia does not prohibit non-lawyers from 
giving legal advice outside the courtroom, paralegals, have been 
able to play an important role in assisting indigent Zambians in 
need of legal assistance, both through the direct provision of legal 
advice and through pre-conflict education and sensitization 
programs.283  While Zambian paralegals cannot supplant the work 
of lawyers, they can supplement that work and can mitigate some 
of the harm the scarcity of lawyers in the country has caused.  Yet 
despite the potential benefits of paralegal work, few Zambian 
paralegals currently provide legal services to prisoners, the most 
vulnerable group within the Zambian justice system.284  Moreover, 
 
283 See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 21; Paralegal Alliance Network, University 
of Zambia School of Law, & Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 
30. 
284 Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law & 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 30. 
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the extreme scarcity of resources, lack of standardization of the 
profession, and the limited education of many working as 
paralegals in Zambia reduces their impact. 
Although Zambia‘s Legal Practitioner‘s Act requires that 
anyone representing a criminal defendant in court must have been 
admitted to the bar,285 the country has no regulations preventing 
non-practitioners from giving mere legal advice outside the 
courtroom.286  Consequently, unlike American paralegals,287 
paralegals in Zambia can and do operate autonomously.288  These 
paralegals are generally affiliated with non-profit, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), most of which engage in 
information, education, and sensitization campaigns to make 
people aware of their legal rights.289  These sorts of campaigns can 
obviate the need for litigation and can reduce the need for more 
expensive legal services from lawyers.  Some NGOs also use 
paralegals to offer basic, individualized legal advice to clients 
 
285 The Legal Practitioners Act provides that non-practitioners may not act as 
advocates in any civil or criminal proceedings.  Legal Practitioners Act of 1973, 
Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2003) § 42.  However, a separate provision 
provides that nothing in the Act should be construed to prohibit non-practitioners 
from representing clients in court in civil matters, so long as the rules of the court 
permit the practice.  Legal Practitioners Act of 1973, Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF 
ZAMBIA (2003) § 3, cl. (3)(a). 
286  Stapleton, supra note 36, at 21 (noting that Zambian paralegals are not 
regulated).  The Legal Practitioners Act does prohibit some out-of-court legal 
activities by non-practitioners, including the preparation, for money, of written 
documents relating to legal proceedings and the preparation, for money, of letters 
threatening legal action if the recipient does not pay money or comply with a 
request to perform or desist from some action.  Legal Practitioners Act of 1973, 
Cap. 30, 4 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2003) § 44. 
287 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (1983) (―[L]imiting the 
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal 
services by unqualified persons.‖); Thais E. Mootz, Independent Paralegals Can Fill 
the Gap in Unmet Legal Services for the Low-Income Community, 5 D.C. L. REV. 189, 
197 (2000) (noting that the underlying theory behind unauthorized practice of law 
statutes in the United States is that ―only those who have graduated from an 
accredited law school and have passed the bar are able to give competent legal 
advice‖); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1806 (noting that, despite recommendations 
from scholars and practitioners to broaden court access through the provision of 
non-lawyer services, sweeping bans on unauthorized practice of law, criminal 
prohibitions against unauthorized provision of legal services, and the majority of 
significant judicial rulings on the issue militate against expanding the practice). 
288 See Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, & 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 44–45 (noting that Zambian 
paralegals frequently operate without any supervision from lawyers). 
289 Id. at 30. 
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about their particular cases.290  Moreover, because Zambian 
paralegals tend to be affiliated with NGOs performing charitable 
work, Zambians seeking their assistance generally do not face the 
kinds of financial hurdles associated with hiring a lawyer.  In fact, 
most organizations offering paralegal services do not condition 
their work on any sort of means-based testing, and the services 
they provide are usually free to clients.291 
 Though there is no doubt that Zambian paralegals play a vital 
role in helping to meet the country‘s legal needs, the profession 
cannot, even under the best of circumstances, perform the kind of 
sophisticated work or analysis many clients require from a legal 
counselor.  And in Zambia, the limitations that paralegals would 
face anywhere are compounded by a host of problems stemming 
from the challenges Zambia faces as a developing country.  First, 
despite the use of the term ―paralegal‖ to describe a range of 
service-providers, there are no common standards encompassing 
either the qualifications of Zambian paralegals or the work they 
perform.292  This concern might be less significant if Zambian 
paralegals were subject to regular oversight by lawyers and acting 
merely in support roles.  However, because paralegals in Zambia 
often give substantive legal advice and operate with little or no 
supervision, the lack of standards regulating the profession is 
troubling. 
Of particular concern, Zambian paralegals have not been 
subject to any uniform criteria to determine their eligibility to 
operate as paralegals or to dispense legal advice.293  Fortunately, 
most legal aid service providers in Zambia require anyone they 
hire as a paralegal to have at least a 12th grade education.294  
Ideally, this ensures a minimal level of sophistication that reduces 
the harm that can result from dissemination of bad legal advice.  
Furthermore, several organizations provide trainings for paralegals 
that range in duration from five days to nine weeks.295  
Nonetheless, some organizations have no formal hiring 
requirements for paralegals.296  Given the seriousness of the 
 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 34. 
292 Id. at 40–44. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 40. 
295 Id. at 44. 
296 Id. at 40. 
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responsibilities Zambian paralegals regularly shoulder, Zambia‘s 
nascent paralegal services industry would certainly benefit from 
standardized admission and training requirements. 
In fact, a group of four NGOs calling itself the Paralegal 
Alliance Network (PAN) has, in an attempt to professionalize 
Zambia‘s community of paralegals, developed a curriculum that 
would standardize paralegal training.297  The curriculum entails a 
three-year diploma course, which includes six months of clinical 
work.298  Though this program would have the benefit of giving all 
Zambian paralegals sufficient training to handle their often broad 
professional responsibilities, implementation of the curriculum 
would be fraught with a number of difficulties and drawbacks.  
First, a three-year program would virtually mirror the period 
required for earning a Zambian law degree, which involves three 
years of legal instruction plus one year in humanities.  This 
daunting prospect might deter many capable prospective 
paralegals from entering the profession.  Perhaps more 
importantly, transforming PAN‘s curriculum into a formal 
diploma course would require a great investment of human and 
financial resources.  Given the dependence on donor funding,  
upon which all of PAN‘s member organizations and other 
Zambian NGOs that use paralegals rely, and given the extreme 
scarcity of resources available for education in Zambia generally, 
realization of PAN‘s goals may be unrealistically ambitious.  As it 
is, the severe shortage of resources available to legal aid 
organizations using paralegals seriously limits the impact of their 
work.   
Perhaps the most significant dilemma for the Zambian 
paralegal industry to overcome is the lack of adequate incentive 
structures to attract and retain qualified paralegals.  Most Zambian 
paralegals work as volunteers rather than as salaried employees, 
and, outside of urban centers, the majority of paralegals have no 
computers or vehicles.299  While some organizations can afford to 
provide their paralegals with sporadic allowances for telephone 
communication and transportation, others cannot afford even these 
meager expenses.  In some areas, paralegals without offices operate 
sitting under trees in the communities they serve.300  This scenario 
 
297 Id. at 44. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 46. 
300 Id. 
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is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  All paralegal 
organizations in Zambia are dependent on funding from external 
donors, and much of the money they rely on is allotted for specific 
projects and activities.301  There is no reason to believe that funding 
will dramatically increase or that donor priorities will shift 
significantly anytime soon. 
Despite the challenges paralegal organizations in Zambia face, 
it would be possible to make better use of the resources currently 
available.  Specifically, Zambian paralegals are not currently 
providing adequate assistance to prisoners, who arguably are the 
country‘s most vulnerable population.  As of 2008, only two 
paralegal organizations worked directly in Zambian prisons, and 
both of these organizations focused on rehabilitation and 
improvement of prison conditions rather than on provision of 
actual legal assistance to prisoners.302  It would be possible, 
however, to use paralegal services to make real progress toward 
improving the efficiency and fairness of Zambia‘s criminal justice 
system.  
In Malawi, paralegals have provided a model for how this 
might be done, as they have greatly increased the efficiency with 
which magistrates‘ courts process criminal claims and have 
facilitated the release of large numbers of Malawian prisoners.303 
Malawi‘s Paralegal Advisory Service (PAS), composed of 
―senior prison officials, police officers, and members of the 
judiciary,‖ has played a key role in the success of these efforts by 
providing oversight and guidance to participating paralegals 
working in prisons to educate prisoners on their rights and on how 
to defend themselves in magistrates‘ courts.304  Paralegals 
operating under the auspices of the PAS have also helped to divert 
large numbers of criminal cases from the overburdened official 
justice system toward community-based resolution at the village 
level, and they have worked to improve conditions for those still 
within the Malawian prison system.305  Finally, Malawian 
paralegals have facilitated the establishment of ―camp-courts‖ held 
within prison compounds, at which magistrates preside over trials 
 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 30. 
303 See generally Anderson, supra note 15, at 1 (noting the role of paralegals in 
Malawian penal reform efforts). 
304 Id. at 4. 
305 Id. at 4, 7–8. 
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of prisoners charged with minor offenses and release the prisoners 
back to their communities to serve out their sentences.306  
Ultimately, the work of Malawian paralegals has led to the release 
of thousands of prisoners.307  Based on Malawi‘s success, paralegals 
in Benin, Kenya, and Uganda have adopted similar programs.308 
Because most NGOs using paralegals in Zambia keep no 
comprehensive statistics on their caseloads, it is impossible to 
know the extent of their impact with any precision.309  Nonetheless, 
Zambian paralegals have undeniably mitigated the effects of the 
country‘s paucity of lawyers, and they have managed to do so with 
extremely limited resources and training.  Even so, the benefits 
derived from the work of Zambian paralegals could be increased if 
the requirements for entry into the profession were standardized, 
and with some reallocation of currently available resources 
including efforts to duplicate the successes of paralegals in Malawi.  
These issues are discussed in greater detail in the next Section of 
this Article. 
7. THE WAY FORWARD 
Although some of the problems I have described in this Article 
are complex and intractable, African legal reformers could address 
many of these challenges through relatively straightforward policy 
improvements and through reallocation of the scarce resources 
currently available.  Because of colonial policies that discouraged 
education for native populations, the African legal profession 
began to develop only after independence.  The monumental task 
of building a profession to meet the needs of a new system foreign 
to most of the people subject to its rules would be daunting in any 
context.  Africa‘s poverty has compounded that difficulty in ways 
 
306 Id. at 6 (noting that the program has encouraged magistrates to screen 
cases at prisons). 
307 Id. at 5 (explaining that these releases were accomplished via ―bail, 
discharge of the case, dismissal or . . . compassionate grounds‖). 
308 See Penal Reform Int‘l, The Paralegal Advisory Service: A Role for Paralegals in 
the Criminal Justice System, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING 
THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 145, 147 (PENAL REFORM INT‘L & BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC 
OF THE NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW eds., 2007) (noting ―the common features‖ between 
the various programs, including training in ―criminal law and procedure‖). 
309 See Paralegal Alliance Network, University of Zambia School of Law, & 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 38 (noting that although 
some record-keeping mechanisms were utilized including monthly, quarterly or 
annual reports and work plans, few of the organizations were able to provide any 
detail regarding workload. 
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that are impossible to overcome fully without access to resources 
currently unavailable to most countries on the continent or their 
key institutions.  Numerous factors, including World Bank 
conditionalities, donor fatigue, and the indeterminate course of 
Africa‘s economic development, make availability of such 
resources uncertain for the foreseeable future.  Nonetheless, real 
progress is achievable through a series of reforms focused on 
making better use of currently available legal resources to make 
legal assistance more accessible to average Africans and on 
increasing the number of African lawyers.  Because Zambia‘s 
problems mirror similar issues throughout the continent, potential 
solutions in Zambia provide a possible model for broader, regional 
reform. 
First, even with the limited number of lawyers now practicing 
in Zambia, several amendments to the current legal aid framework 
could enhance the quantity and quality of assistance for those most 
in need of legal aid in Zambia.  Specifically, to provide maximum 
protection for Zambian criminal defendants, whose fundamental 
rights are more in jeopardy than any other actors in the legal 
system, the Legal Aid Board should reduce or eliminate its civil 
caseload.  At the same time, the National Assembly should amend 
the Legal Practitioners Act to allow for contingency fees, which 
would make legal assistance from private practitioners available to 
more Zambians in civil cases.  Additionally, LAZ should work to 
implement its resolution to require pro bono work from Zambian 
lawyers.  Finally, Zambian paralegal organizations could effect 
major positive change by emulating paralegals in Malawi who 
have helped implement measures to improve the efficiency and 
accuracy of Malawi‘s criminal justice system.   
Second, Zambia could grow its legal community without 
sacrificing the quality of its lawyers by implementing policy 
reforms at UNZA and at ZIALE.  Reform in the Zambian legal 
academy should include increasing the pay of law faculty and 
restricting the outside work of law teachers.  At the post-graduate 
law training institute, ZIALE, changes in hiring practices and 
enhanced grading transparency, coupled with possible 
amendments to the curriculum, are in order.  Implementation of 
each of these reforms would be fraught with potential for political 
and inertial resistance; convincing relevant stakeholders to 
implement them would require sensitivity to the interests of 
numerous players in complex systems.  Nonetheless, for the most 
part, these suggestions would not require dramatic increases in 
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available resources.  Instead, redistribution of currently available 
resources could bring many of this Article‘s recommendations to 
fruition. 
7.1. Increasing Impact 
First, several initiatives could increase the availability of legal 
representation for those Zambians most in need of it without 
increasing the number of practicing lawyers in the country.  One 
such initiative would entail a shift in emphasis away from civil 
cases at the Legal Aid Board.  Scholars and legal activists have 
frequently argued that legal assistance in civil cases is a 
fundamental component of a modern legal aid system.310  In the 
United States in particular, where an estimated eighty percent of 
the civil legal needs of the poor are unmet,311 commentators have 
often pointed out that the widespread failure to provide legal aid 
in civil cases casts a cloud of shame on the country.312  Of course, it 
is undeniable that civil cases can imperil extraordinarily important 
interests, and there are powerful arguments that a wealthy nation 
has a moral responsibility to offer legal aid in many such cases.  
Even so, the right to physical freedom is so basic and primary that 
it must be prioritized over the vast majority of interests at stake in 
civil cases.  Yet civil cases comprise nearly fifteen percent of the 
Legal Aid Board‘s caseload, and most of those cases are land 
 
310 See, e.g., Bernice K. Leber, The Time for Civil Gideon is Now, 25 TOURO L. 
REV. 23, 28 (2009) (noting the ―increased need for funding for civil services [and] a 
federal Civil Gideon statute‖ in the United States); Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a 
Human Right: Is the United States Going to Join Step with the Rest of the Developed 
World, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 769 (2006) (commenting on the 
American Bar Association‘s resolution urging ―federal, state, and territorial 
governments‖ to provide a right to legal counsel for civil litigation when essential 
―human needs are at stake‖); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1799 (arguing that access to 
representation is vital to the justice system‘s legitimacy because it ensures that 
rights are made meaningful); John T. Broderick Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation 
of Do-it-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A21 (reporting on the 
increasing occurrence of poor litigants appearing without legal counsel because, 
among other reasons, they cannot afford attorneys, they ―do not qualify for legal 
aid,‖ and budgets of attorney provision services are dwindling). 
311 See Rhode, supra note 17, at 1785 (noting also that forty to sixty percent of 
the legal needs of the middle class are unmet). 
312 See Leber, supra note 310, at 30 (applauding the efforts to ―fight for access 
to justice‖); Lidman, supra note 310, at 789–800 (summarizing the Civil Gideon-
like services provided in forty-nine other countries); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1787–
88, 1799 (noting the dearth of funds spent on legal services, as well as the 
sometimes irrational allocation of these resources). 
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disputes.313  Meanwhile, of the almost 4,500 criminal cases in which 
defendants entered pleas in magistrates‘ courts in Lusaka District 
in 2009, the Board represented only eighty-nine clients.  Given 
these dire figures, it is imperative that the Legal Aid Board redirect 
its energy toward greater representation of criminal defendants in 
magistrates‘ courts. 
While reducing or eliminating the civil caseload of the Legal 
Aid Board would allow the Board‘s lawyers to provide more 
support for criminal defendants, the shift would, of course, leave 
some or all of the Board‘s civil clients without representation.  
Nonetheless, amendment of the Legal Practitioners Act to allow for 
contingency fee payments would more than make up for the 
difference; it would, in fact, significantly increase the availability of 
lawyers for Zambians engaged in civil litigation.  As it is, only a 
handful of countries allow the use of contingency fees.314  Yet, by 
allowing lawyers to accept payment as a portion of recovered 
damages, Zambia, and other African countries, could open the 
possibility of legal representation for much larger portions of their 
citizenry.   
Of course, allowing contingency payments would not mean 
that every Zambian with a colorable civil claim would be able to 
obtain the services of a lawyer.  In countries that do allow 
contingency fees, lawyers tend to accept only cases that seem likely 
ex ante to have the greatest chances of success and to result in the 
most lucrative payouts.  Nonetheless, in a country with a per capita 
gross national product of only $1070,315 and in which lawyers often 
charge hundreds of dollars an hour, there is no question that 
changing the law to allow contingency fee payments would result 
in a major expansion of legal services available to people other 
than the wealthy in Zambia.  This simple change in the Legal 
Practitioners Act could be one of the most impactful reforms 
possible without massive growth of the legal profession itself, and 
 
313 Interview with Anderson Ngulube, supra note 3. 
314 See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY 
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 258–59 (2004) (assessing the contingency 
fee arrangements found in Canada, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Irish 
Republic, Australia, New Zealand, Dominican Republic, Greece, France, Brazil, 
and Japan). 
315 See Data by Country—Zambia, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/zambia (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) 
(providing information about Zambia‘s gross national income per capita, among 
other economic data). 
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could lead to tremendous improvement of Zambia‘s civil justice 
system.  
The Law Association of Zambia could also contribute to 
increased access to justice by working toward the implementation 
of its resolution to require pro bono work from Zambian lawyers.  
With only 731 private practitioners in the country, Zambian 
lawyers have an extraordinary privilege to operate with limited 
competition in a restricted market.  For now, failure rates at ZIALE 
ensure the continued suppression of that market.  That LAZ has 
resolved to require pro bono work from Zambian lawyers 
represents a progressive move in itself.  In the United States, for 
example, not only have there been virtually no successful attempts 
to require lawyers to do pro bono work, but state bars have also 
consistently refused even to attempt to implement mandatory pro 
bono policies.316  Meanwhile, some state courts have held that 
requiring unpaid legal work violates the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.317  LAZ‘s resolution thus represents a 
recognition of the fortunate status of Zambian lawyers, whose high 
income levels reflect the limited access to the profession created in 
part by flaws in the bar admissions program those lawyers 
administer.  Nonetheless, over three years after LAZ made its 
determination on pro bono requirements, Zambian lawyers are still 
not subject to any rule on pro bono work.  To implement such a 
rule would require amendment of the Legal Practitioner‘s Act.318 
Finally, even with the limited number of lawyers practicing in 
Zambia, and even with the limited resources available for legal aid 
services, Zambian paralegals could make dramatic improvements 
in the criminal justice system by emulating the work of paralegals 
in Malawi.  The success of Malawi‘s paralegals is particularly 
salient to efforts to improve access to justice in Zambia because of 
the similarities between the two countries‘ justice systems and 
 
316 See Rhode, supra note 17, at 1807–09 (noting that, despite Supreme Court 
dicta that pro bono legal service is a public duty, U.S. courts are reluctant to 
explicitly require, rather than encourage, lawyers to participate in pro bono 
projects).  
317 See, e.g., DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987) 
(holding that the Takings Clause of the Alaska Constitution prohibited compelled 
representation by an individual attorney without just compensation); see also 
McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa 1982) (stating that, under Iowa 
and federal constitutional law, lawyers who are compelled to represent indigents 
may receive compensation at the public expense). 
318 Interview with Edward Sakala, supra note 7. 
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resource challenges.  In Malawi, for example, as of 2006, there were 
only about ―300 qualified lawyers for [a population of] 11 million 
people.‖319  At the same time, the government-run Legal Aid 
Department employed only four lawyers to serve the entire 
country‘s legal aid needs.320  Moreover, inefficiencies in Malawi‘s 
justice system were even worse than in Zambia, as half the prison 
population in 2006 was on remand, and some prisoners had been 
waiting more than seven years for their trials to begin.321 
Part of the success of Malawi‘s paralegals depended on their 
ability to co-opt crucial actors in the Malawian justice system.  By 
giving the police, prison officials, and the judiciary key roles in the 
PAS, Malawian paralegals protected themselves against the kind of 
obstruction that could have confounded their attempts to improve 
the system.  Most importantly, Malawian paralegals have been 
careful not to tread on territory Malawian lawyers would be likely 
to perceive as their unique province; despite requests from 
magistrates to represent prisoners in court, Malawi‘s paralegals 
have demurred, noting that trial advocacy is not their role and that 
lawyers must perform that task.322  Any Zambian attempt to 
replicate the success of Malawi‘s PAS must similarly include 
efforts to gain support and assistance from prison officials, police, 
the judiciary, and the bar.  If those attempts fail, Zambian 
paralegals could, at worst, suffer the fate of American paralegals, 
with extremely circumscribed professional roles, including severe 
sanctions for dispensation of even basic legal advice.323  Ideally, 
however, Zambian paralegals could achieve significant reform of 
the criminal justice system, filling some of the titanic gaps left by 
the country‘s scarcity of lawyers. 
7.2. Increasing the Size of the Bar 
In addition to restructuring programs and institutions to 
generate greater impact given the current scarcity of lawyers, 
reforms in the Zambian legal academy and of the bar admissions 
 
319 See Anderson, supra note 15, at 2. 
320 Id.  
321 Id. at 3. 
322 Id. at 6–7. 
323 In other African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Tanzania, lawyers have, at times, 
condemned reforms intended to expand access to justice with use of lawyers as 
―poor man‘s justice.‖  See Stapleton, supra note 36, at 6 & n.11. 
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process at ZIALE could facilitate the admission of more lawyers to 
the Zambian bar.  Of course, creating a larger community of legal 
practitioners, in and of itself, would not make legal aid services 
more accessible to the public.  But greater competition in the legal 
market would bring down the cost of legal services in general, 
which would make legal advice available to more Zambians. 
Any examination of the problems that lead most aspiring 
lawyers to fail the bar admissions program must begin with the 
process by which would-be lawyers train for entry into the 
profession, and dysfunction in the Zambian legal academy has, 
without question, contributed to high failure rates at ZIALE.  A 
serious attempt to address the dearth of Zambian lawyers must 
include plans to improve conditions at Zambian law schools, with 
particular emphasis on making law teachers more professionally 
accountable and more available to their students, as well as on 
increasing student access to learning materials. 
First and foremost, full-time Zambian law teachers must honor 
their responsibilities to work full time on teaching and research.  A 
law school with an absentee faculty cannot possibly fulfill its 
commitment to provide students with the attention necessary to 
produce graduates prepared to become practicing lawyers.  
Furthermore, the teaching of a faculty that generates little or no 
scholarship is likely to stagnate; if legal academics are not 
constantly engaged in deliberation about how the law can and 
should develop, they will be more likely to teach only what the law 
is, rather than what it might become.  Consequently, the rote, 
mechanistic style of teaching common in African law schools will 
continue.  To that end, UNZA and other law schools in Zambia 
should implement policies to discourage law faculty from 
pursuing outside work, and they should provide incentives for law 
teachers to treat their academic employment as a full-time 
commitment and to produce scholarship. 
To accomplish these goals, UNZA should end its policy of 
allowing law faculty to spend large amounts of time in private 
practice.  Since 1994, this policy has led law teachers at UNZA to 
abandon their responsibilities to the law school, spending the vast 
majority of their time at their respective law firms, which provide 
far more income than the meager salaries available at UNZA.  
Professor Kirsten A. Dauphinais has noted that African law schools 
that prohibit law faculty from taking outside jobs have lost their 
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best teachers to more lucrative opportunities.324  While it might 
well be true that UNZA and other Zambian law schools would lose 
some of their best-credentialed faculty if they limited the time full-
time law teachers could spend practicing law, the resulting 
scenario would almost certainly be superior to the status quo.  
Now, on any given day, even in the middle of a semester, one can 
frequently walk down the corridors of the School of Law without 
finding a single member of the faculty in his office.325  Now, law 
teachers are regularly unavailable for their posted office hours.326  
Now, law school lecturers skip large numbers of classes without 
notice to students or to law school administrators.327  Surely it 
would be better to settle for a mediocre faculty of truly full-time 
academics than to limp along with an arguably more accomplished 
faculty that refuses to be present at school. 
Zambian law schools could also offset the enticement of 
lucrative alternative employment opportunities by raising the 
salaries of law teachers, in recognition of the very different markets 
for legal expertise and for the kind of knowledge academics in 
most other disciplines possess.  Although it would be infeasible to 
make salaries for legal academics equivalent to the incomes of 
Zambia‘s most successful private practitioners, it would be 
possible to narrow the gap.  Without question, raising the salaries 
of law teachers in comparison to those of other academics would 
be politically difficult.  Nonetheless, the move would represent an 
acknowledgment of economic reality.  Additionally, Zambian 
universities could implement the change gradually by weighting 
the apportionment of periodic university-wide salary raises. 
Increasing student access to books and other learning materials 
will also be a crucial element in any serious plan to improve the 
quality of Zambian legal education.  As mentioned, the 
unavailability of required law books was the most commonly cited 
problem amongst UNZA students surveyed on challenges at the 
 
324 See Dauphinais, supra note 13, at 98 (stating that in East Africa, the 
recruitment and retention of law instructors has been particularly difficult 
because of the ―low salaries . . . [and] heavy teaching demands‖). 
325 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110. 
326 Id.; see also Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia 
School of Law, supra note 150. 
327 Interview with Anne Chanda, supra note 110; see also Survey of Third-Year 
Law Students at the University of Zambia School of Law, supra note 150. 
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School of Law.328  Needless to say, as long as students are unable to 
obtain required reading materials for their classes, the quality of 
their learning experiences will suffer significantly.  At UNZA, 
policies already in place may eventually enhance student access to 
required reading materials for their classes.  As more local faculty 
produce casebooks for publication, UNZA press could prove to be 
a much more reliable source than British publishers, whose books 
are difficult and expensive to obtain from overseas, and are 
generally out of stock at Zambian bookstores.  Nevertheless, locally 
produced casebooks have also proven to be prohibitively 
expensive for many law students, and they too are often out of 
stock at UNZA‘s bookstore.329  To redress this problem, UNZA and 
other Zambian law schools must find ways to increase the supply 
and reduce the cost of required reading materials for class.  Given 
the large number of law students at UNZA and Zambia‘s new law 
schools, this goal might be attained by moving to a lower margin, 
higher volume business model, which could provide all of 
Zambia‘s law students with cheaper books while maintaining 
overall profit levels for UNZA Press.  Zambian law schools might 
achieve similar ends by requiring teachers to distribute copies of 
relevant cases, along with their own commentary, or to post such 
materials online.330  Whatever solution Zambian law schools 
choose, it is imperative that they ensure the availability of learning 
materials for the students in their charge. 
Unless and until Zambian law schools remedy the problems of 
faculty absenteeism and the unavailability of learning materials, 
education at these schools will remain substandard.  Crucially, 
however, at least partial solutions to these dilemmas are possible 
despite the financial constraints confronting all Zambian 
institutions of higher education.  Without changes at ZIALE, 
however, even the most effective reforms of Zambian legal 
 
328 See Survey of Third-Year Law Students at the University of Zambia School 
of Law, supra note 150. 
329 Interview with Misozi Lwatula, supra note 145. 
330 For several years, UNZA‘s School of Law administered the Zambia Legal 
Information Institute, which was established in 1996 as an Internet repository of 
Zambian legal data, including case law and statutes.  The site also provided space 
for lecturers to post class materials, but few members of the faculty took 
advantage of this feature, and the school no longer updates or administers the 
site.  The Zambian judiciary has expressed interest in taking over administration 
of the site but has not yet taken any action. Interview with Anne Chanda, supra 
note 110. 
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education will likely be insufficient to stimulate growth of the legal 
profession sufficiently to meet Zambia‘s potential to produce 
qualified new lawyers.  To that end, ZIALE should reform its 
employment practices by vetting qualified candidates for teaching 
positions in an open hiring process.  Moreover, however 
accomplished ZIALE‘s lecturers may be as practitioners or jurists, 
ZIALE should create systems to monitor its faculty‘s classroom 
performance and to hold substandard teachers accountable.  This 
could be done through classroom visits by qualified legal 
academics, teaching evaluations from students, or both.331 
It is also worth considering revising ZIALE‘s curriculum to 
reflect the original, clinical orientation intended for African bar 
admissions programs.  First, ZIALE teachers, most of whom are 
practitioners with no academic training beyond the bachelor‘s 
degree,332 would likely be better prepared to teach using a clinical 
format, rather than the academic framework that has developed at 
ZIALE.  Second, a clinical focus at ZIALE would likely provide 
students with better training for the careers as practitioners, for 
which the program is meant to groom them. 
Finally, though I have discussed it above, it is worth 
mentioning again that ZIALE should make its testing and grading 
process transparent.  Only by allowing students to view failing 
exams can ZIALE ensure the accuracy and integrity of its results.  
If ZIALE‘s teachers and administrators are confident of the validity 
of ZIALE‘s grading process, they have little to lose by opening that 
process to scrutiny.  On the other hand, ZIALE students, who have 
the highest interest in ensuring the accuracy of their results, and 
who could learn a great deal from being able to review their failing 
papers, have much to gain. 
There are no universal solutions to the continental shortage of 
qualified lawyers.  Further, even significant increases in the size of 
the African bar would not be a panacea for the barriers Africans 
have faced in accessing legal assistance.  In fact, African lawyers 
have often been opponents of innovative proposals for increasing 
access to justice that they have seen as undermining their 
professional monopoly on dispensation of legal expertise.  
Nonetheless, lawyers are crucial to the adjudication of complex 
 
331 Currently, ZIALE does not use teaching evaluations or have any 
mechanism to monitor the teaching of its instructors.  Interview with Palan 
Mulonda, supra note 31. 
332 Id. 
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civil claims and serious criminal matters and, moreover, to 
establishing and maintaining societies that function based on the 
rule of law, and their numbers are sorely lacking across the 
continent.  As documented in this Article, many of the problems 
that have hindered growth of the Zambian legal profession are 
nearly ubiquitous throughout sub-Saharan Africa.  Thus, it is likely 
that some of the reforms I have recommended to help mitigate the 
effects of the scarcity of Zambian lawyers and to stimulate 
admission of new lawyers would benefit other countries facing 
similar crises.  Ultimately, if Zambia‘s relevant institutions adopt 
these reforms, they will increase access to justice in the country, 
and Zambia‘s improved system could serve as a model for the rest 
of the continent and for the world. 
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